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Secure Multiterminal Source Coding
with Side Information at the Eavesdropper
Joffrey Villard and Pablo Piantanida
Abstract—The problem of secure multiterminal source coding
with side information at the eavesdropper is investigated. This
scenario consists of a main encoder (referred to as Alice) that
wishes to compress a single source but simultaneously satisfying
the desired requirements on the distortion level at a legitimate
receiver (referred to as Bob) and the equivocation rate –average
uncertainty– at an eavesdropper (referred to as Eve). It is
further assumed the presence of a (public) rate-limited link
between Alice and Bob. In this setting, Eve perfectly observes
the information bits sent by Alice to Bob and has also access
to a correlated source which can be used as side information. A
second encoder (referred to as Charlie) helps Bob in estimating
Alice’s source by sending a compressed version of its own
correlated observation via a (private) rate-limited link, which
is only observed by Bob. For instance, the problem at hands
can be seen as the unification between the Berger-Tung and the
secure source coding setups. Inner and outer bounds on the so
called rates-distortion-equivocation region are derived. The inner
region turns to be tight for two cases: (i) uncoded side information
at Bob and (ii) lossless reconstruction of both sources at Bob –
secure distributed lossless compression–. Application examples to
secure lossy source coding of Gaussian and binary sources in the
presence of Gaussian and binary/ternary (resp.) side informations
are also considered. Optimal coding schemes are characterized
for some cases of interest where the statistical differences between
the side information at the decoders and the presence of a non-
zero distortion at Bob can be fully exploited to guarantee secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the classical problem of compressing a source at
a sensor node (referred to as Alice) which must be estimated
at a remote destination (referred to as Bob) within a certain
distortion level. Assume also that a (public) rate-limited link
is available between the two devices. In addition to this,
the encoder wishes to leak the least possible amount of
information about its source to an eavesdropper (referred to
as Eve) e.g., an untrusted sensor, who perfectly observes the
information bits sent by Alice and may have access to an
observation correlated to the source. Another sensor (referred
to as Charlie) will help Bob in estimating Alice’s source by
sending a compressed version of its own correlated observation
on a (private) rate-limited link, which is only observed by
Bob. In this setting, the correlation between the observations
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can be useful not only to decrease the rate needed for the
communications, but also to increase secrecy, which means
the average uncertainty of Eve about Alice’s source. From
a theoretical viewpoint, the problem at hands is therefore
very rich and still quite open, as it contains, as subproblems,
the long-standing information-theoretic problem of distributed
lossy source coding, as well as recent ones e.g., source coding
with security constraints.
Slepian and Wolf [1] introduced the problem of distributed
lossless compression i.e., when Bob wants to perfectly es-
timate both sources of Alice and Charlie. Wyner [2] and
Ahlswede and Körner [3] characterized the achievable region
when only one source is to be estimated i.e., source coding
with coded (or partial) side information. Generalization of
the Slepian-Wolf setup to arbitrary distortion levels on both
sources was introduced by Berger [4], who provided inner and
outer bounds on the achievable region which do not match in
general. When Bob is intended to estimate only one source,
Berger et al. [5] provided a new inner bound which was further
proved in [6] to be equivalent to the one of [4], and strictly
sub-optimal [7]. Several results of optimality were proved in
case of uncoded side information [8], lossless reconstruction
of at least one source [9], and in some special cases, including
Gaussian sources with quadratic distortion measure [10], [11].
Over the years, these topics have been the focus of intense
study and some remarkable progress has been made in the-
oretical and practical aspects, including general frameworks
for lossless compression with multiple terminals [12], [13],
lossy source coding with uncertain side information at the
decoder [14], [15], lossy compression with partially separated
encoders [16] or with many decoders [17]–[19], some results
of optimality for Gaussian sources in various contexts [20],
[21], as well as the design of nested codes for distributed
compression e.g., using parity-check [22], lattice [22]–[24],
or algebraic trellis [25] codes. Nevertheless, in spite of these
efforts, the simplest scenario of distributed lossy compression
first introduced in [4] still remains open.
On the other hand, extensive research has been done on
secure communication. The traditional focus was on cryp-
tography, based on computational complexity where secu-
rity only depends on the intractability assumption of some
hard problems (e.g., factoring large integers). As a matter of
fact, the security requirements were only taken into account
in the upper layers of the OSI model (e.g., the applica-
tion layer), assuming that reliable communication/compression
schemes were already available. Shannon in [26] introduced
the information-theoretic notion of secrecy, where security
is measured through the equivocation rate –the remaining
2uncertainty about the message– at the eavesdropper. This
information-theoretic approach of secrecy allows to consider
security issues at the physical layer, and ensures uncondition-
ally (regardless of the eavesdropper’s computing power and
time) secure schemes, since it only relies on the statistical
properties of the system. Adopting this approach in a channel
coding perspective, Wyner introduced the wiretap channel
in [27] and showed that it is possible to send information
at a positive rate with perfect secrecy as long as the channel
of the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the legitimate
user’s one. Csiszàr and Körner [28] extended this result to
the setting of general broadcast channels with any arbitrary
equivocation rate. Since then, several extensions have been
proposed e.g., for fading channels [29], arbitrary i.e., not
necessarily stationary memoryless, channels [30], channels
with state information at the encoder [31], cooperative relay
broadcast channels [32] (see also [33]–[35] for a review of
recent results), as well as practical coding schemes for secure
communication e.g., nested codes for (Gaussian and binary)
type-II wiretap channels [36], LDPC [37], [38] and lattice [39]
codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel, polar codes for binary
symmetric channels [40], and construction of secure codes
using sparse matrices [41] or ordinary channel codes [42].
So far, very few work has been reported on source coding
problems with security constraints, while early work [43], [44]
showed that the presence of correlation between the different
observations may guarantee some secrecy.
Researchers have employed two approaches in the literature
of secure source coding. In fact, it is assumed either that
there already exists a secure rate-limited link between Alice
and Bob, which allows the system to use secret keys, or
at least the decoders have access to some side information
about the source. In the scenario of secret key sharing, both
lossless and lossy compression have been studied in various
contexts [45]–[50]. Classical lossy source coding followed by
encryption using the secret key was proved to be optimal
when the receivers have no side information [48]. For the
second scenario, recent work [51] considered the case of
lossless source coding with (uncoded) side information at
both decoders under the assumption of no rate constraint in
the communication between Alice and Bob. In such a case,
the usual Slepian-Wolf scheme is proved to be insufficient.
Lossless source coding with coded side information, resp.
distributed lossless compression, has been studied in [52], [53],
resp. [54]. In their “one-sided helper” scenario, the authors
of [53] characterized the achievable region when only one
source is to be perfectly estimated and Eve does not have
side information. In particular, they proved that the achievable
scheme of Wyner [2] and Ahlswede and Körner [3] achieves
the whole region. Inner and outer bounds on the achievable
region for secure distributed lossless compression have been
proposed in [54]. Secure lossy source coding with side infor-
mation at the decoders received less attention. As a matter
of fact, if the (uncoded) side informations at the decoders are
degraded then the achievable region can be derived as a special
case of [50] where Wyner-Ziv coding [8] is optimal.
In this paper, we investigate the general problem of secure
lossy source coding of memoryless sources with coded side
information at the legitimate receiver in the presence of an
eavesdropper, who in addition to observe the information
bits can also have access to correlated side information, as
depicted in Fig. 1. It is assumed that all links between encoders
and decoders are noiseless so that they cannot provide any
advantage to increase secrecy. This setting can be seen as
the extension of the Berger et al. problem [5] to the one
with security constraints. We provide inner and outer bounds
on the achievable region, referred to as the rates-distortion-
equivocation region. It should be noted that the central dif-
ficulty lies in the evaluation of the equivocation at Eve and
that these bounds do not match in general because of a long
Markov chain condition. From the proposed inner region, we
derive two novel results of optimality for the cases of: (i)
uncoded side information, generalizing the results in [51], [52]
to any arbitrary distortion level, and (ii) lossless reconstruction
of both sources at the legitimate receiver –distributed lossless
compression–, refining [54]. When dealing with the lossy case
in the presence of uncoded side information, it should be
mentioned here that if one side information (either at Bob
or Eve) is less noisy than the other, then Wyner-Ziv coding is
sufficient. Similarly, for the distributed lossless compression
setting it is shown that if the side information at Eve is
less noisy than the observation of Charlie, then Slepian-Wolf
coding achieves the whole region. As an application example,
we consider the case of secure lossy source coding of a
Gaussian source with Gaussian side informations, extending
[10] to the scenario with security constraints. We also consider
the case of secure lossy source coding of a binary source,
where the (uncoded) side information at Bob (resp. Eve)
is the output of a binary erasure channel (resp. a binary
symmetric channel) with the source as the input. This model
is of theoretical interest since neither Bob nor Eve can always
be a lessnoisy decoder.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
states definitions along with the main results on secure lossy
source coding with coded side information at the legitimate
receiver. Section III (resp. Section IV) provides an optimal
characterization of the achievable region for the case of
uncoded side information at Bob (resp. distributed lossless
compression). The detailed proofs are relegated to the Ap-
pendices as well as a reminder on some useful notions and
results. Section V presents application examples to Gaussian
and binary sources. Finally, Section VI summarizes the paper
and provides discussions.
Notation
For any sequence (xi)i∈N∗ , notation xnk stands for the
collection (xk, xk+1, . . . , xn). xn1 is simply denoted by xn.
Let T be an arbitrary finite set. The cardinality of T is
denoted by ‖T ‖. For any subset S ⊂ T , notation IS stands
for the indicator function of S in T i.e., for each t ∈ T ,
IS(t) = 1 if t ∈ S, and IS(t) = 0 otherwise. Entropy is
denoted by H(·), and mutual information by I(·; ·). We denote
typical and conditional typical sets by T nδ (X) and T nδ (Y |xn),
respectively (see Appendix A-A for details). Let X , Y and Z
be three random variables on some alphabets with probability
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Figure 1: Secure lossy source coding with coded side information.
distribution p. If p(x|y, z) = p(x|y) for each x, y, z, then X , Y
and Z form a Markov chain, which is denoted by X−
−Y −
−Z .
Random variable Y is said to be less noisy than Z w.r.t. X
if I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) for each random variable U such that
U −
− X −
− (Y, Z) form a Markov chain. This relation is
denoted by Y X Z . For each x ∈ R, notation [x]+ stands
for max(0;x). Logarithms are taken in base 2 and denoted by
log(·). For each a, b ∈ [0, 1], a ⋆ b = a(1− b) + (1− a)b.
II. SECURE LOSSY SOURCE CODING WITH CODED SIDE
INFORMATION
A. Definitions
In this section, we give a more rigorous formulation of the
context depicted in Fig. 1. Let A, C and E be three finite sets.
Alice, Charlie and Eve observe sequences of random variables
(Ai)i∈N∗ , (Ci)i∈N∗ and (Ei)i∈N∗ respectively, which take
values on A, C and E , resp. For each i ∈ N∗, random variables
Ai, Ci and Ei are distributed according to the joint distribution
p(a, c, e) on A×C×E . Moreover, they are independent across
time i.
Let d : A×A→ [0 ; dmax] be a finite distortion measure i.e.,
such that 0 ≤ dmax <∞. We also denote by d the component-
wise mean distortion on An ×An i.e., for each an, bn ∈ An,
d(an, bn) , 1
n
∑n
i=1 d(ai, bi).
Definition 1: An (n,RA, RC)-code for source coding in
this setup is defined by
• An encoding function at Alice denoted by fA : An →
{1, . . . , 2nRA},
• An encoding function at Charlie denoted by fC : Cn →
{1, . . . , 2nRC},
• A decoding function at Bob denoted by g :
{1, . . . , 2nRA} × {1, . . . , 2nRC} → An.
Definition 2: A tuple (RA, RC , D,∆) ∈ R4+ is said to be
achievable if, for any ε > 0, there exists an (n,RA+ ε,RC +
ε)-code (fA, fC , g) such that:
E
[
d
(
An, g(fA(A
n), fC(C
n))
)]
≤ D + ε ,
1
n
H(An|fA(A
n), En) ≥ ∆− ε .
The set of all such achievable tuples is denoted by R∗ and is
referred to as the rates-distortion-equivocation region.
Remark 1: Region R∗ is closed and convex.
Remark 2: Quantities E[d(An, g(fA(An), fC(Cn))] and
1
n
H(An|fA(An), En) in Definition 2 only depend on the
marginal distributions p(a, c) and p(a, e), respectively. The
same holds for region R∗.
U V A E
CW
Figure 2: Inner bound–Graphical representation of probability
distribution p(uvwace).
B. Inner and Outer Bounds on the Rates-Distortion-
Equivocation Region
The following theorem gives an inner bound on region R∗
i.e., it defines region Rin ⊂ R∗.
Theorem 1: A tuple (RA, RC , D,∆) ∈ R4+ is achievable if
there exist random variables U , V , W on some finite sets U , V ,
W , respectively, s.t. the joint distribution writes p(uvwace) =
p(u|v)p(v|a)p(w|c)p(ace), and a function Aˆ : V ×W → A,
that verify the following inequalities:
RA ≥ I(V ;A|W ) , (1)
RC ≥ I(W ;C|V ) , (2)
RA +RC ≥ I(VW ;AC) , (3)
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
, (4)
∆ ≤ H(A|VW ) + I(A;W |U)− I(A;E|U) , (5)
∆−RC ≤ H(A|V )− I(A;E|U)− I(W ;C|V ) . (6)
Region Rin is defined as the convex hull of the set of all such
tuples.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on superposition coding
and random binning at both encoders Alice and Charlie, and
joint decoding at Bob. In the proposed scheme, layer V (on
the top of U ) encodes source A at Alice while layer W
encodes source C at Charlie. A careful analysis of this scheme
along with standard properties of typical sequences enables
to characterize the equivocation rate at Eve. The detailed
4Table I: Corner points.
Corner point (I) (II) (III)
Communication order W, U, V U, W, V U, V, W
RA I(V ;A|W ) I(U ;A) + I(V ;A|UW ) I(V ;A)
RC I(W ;C) I(W ;C|U) I(W ;C|V )
D E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
∆ H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|UW ) H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|UW ) H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|U)
proof is relegated to Appendix B. The above inner region can
also be achieved using a time-sharing combination of three
complementary families of codes. Since this approach may
yield better intuition, its proof is sketched below.
Inequalities (1)–(3) are identical to the ones of Berger
and Tung [4]. They ensure perfect reconstruction of both
variables V and W at Bob, who can hence compute estimate
Aˆ(V,W ) of A. The sum-rate constraint (3) captures the trade-
off between rates RA and RC . The information must be
transmitted by one or the other encoder.
Let us now give some intuition on Equations (5) and (6).
The first term H(A|VW ) corresponds to the equivocation
rate at Bob. Alice thus exploits the admissible distortion at
Bob to increase the equivocation rate at Eve. Moreover, for
given variables V and W , which determine the rates and
the distortion level at Bob, the auxiliary variable U can be
tuned to make Bob more capable than Eve i.e., maximize
I(A;W |U)−I(A;E|U). This quantity represents the gain (or
the loss) at Eve in terms of equivocation rate. At the same time,
Equation (6) imposes a trade-off between the equivocation rate
at Eve ∆ and the rate of Charlie RC , which captures the
fact that ∆ cannot be too large if RC is not. If the secrecy
requirement is harsh, more information must be sent through
the private link (between Charlie and Bob). We will refer to
quantity ∆−RC as the public-link secrecy rate.
Note that Equation (5) also writes
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|UW ) .
Variable U is thus considered as a common message i.e.,
as if Eve could decode it. As a matter of fact, in case of
uncoded side information at Bob (resp. distributed lossless
compression), Proposition 3 (resp. 4) shows that it is opti-
mal to encode U so that Eve can reliably estimate it. The
remaining information rate of Alice (on the public link) i.e.,
I(V ;A|UW ), is directly subtracted from the equivocation rate,
meaning that it is treated as “raw” bits of A.
Sketch of proof of Theorem 1 (Time-sharing combination
technique): We first construct three codes achieving corner
points (I), (II) and (III) illustrated in Fig. 3, 5 and 6. Each
corner point is achieved using a three-step communication
scheme which aim is to reliably deliver variables (U, V ) and
W , descriptions of A at Alice and C at Charlie, respectively, to
Bob. Note that V is on the top of U (superposition coding). At
each step, the information previously received (and decoded) is
used as side-information at Bob. Random binning a la Wyner-
Ziv [8] is performed to take advantage of this side information.
These schemes correspond to all possible combinations of
the set {U, V,W}, provided that U is decoded prior to V ,
as summarized in row #2 of Table I. For each scheme, the
equivocation rate at Eve can be characterized following the
(I)
(II)
(III)
RA
RC
∆
Figure 3: Achievable tuples (RA, RC ,∆) for some fixed
distortion level D.
argument of Appendix B-H. After Fourier-Motzkin elimina-
tion and classical manipulation, we can prove that the three
proposed schemes can achieve corner points (I), (II) and
(III), which coordinates are given in Table I.
Points (I) and (II) correspond to identical distortion and
equivocation rate levels, say D and ∆ (see Fig. 6). By a time-
sharing combination of these schemes, each point on segment
(I)–(II) is also achievable and presents distortion D and
equivocation rate ∆. This segment can be easily described
since the quantity RA + RC is identical for both points (I)
and (II) (see Fig. 5).
Points (II) and (III) correspond to identical distortion
level, say D. By a time-sharing combination of these schemes,
each point on segment (II)–(III) is also achievable and
presents distortion D. This segment can be easily described
since quantities RA +RC and ∆−RC are identical for both
points (II) and (III) (see Fig. 5 and 6, respectively).
Segments (I)–(II) and (II)–(III) define regions which
union is delimited by six hyperplanes given by the equations
of Theorem 1.
Remark 3: The simple union of the regions given by the
equations of Theorem 1 is not convex. In fact, a time-sharing
variable T cannot be included in auxiliary variables U , V and
W . This would break the long Markov chain U −
−V −
−A−

−C −
−W which is essential in our coding scheme.
Remark 4: Projections of points (I) and (III) on the plane
∆ = 0 i.e., when there is no secrecy constraint, are those
obtained using Berger-Tung coding [4]. In this case, point (II)
is useless since it is achievable by a time-sharing combination
5U V A E
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Figure 4: Outer bound–Graphical representation of probability distributions p(uvace) and p(wace).
of points (I) and (III), as shown by Fig. 5. In the general
case, the proposed scheme can however improve the security
of the transmission, as shown in Fig. 6.
Remark 5: When there is no security requirement, Jana
and Blahut [6] recently proved the equivalence of the inner
bounds of [4] and [5], meaning that point (I) alone yields the
same region that points (I) and (III) (after the convex hull
operation). A similar result in our secure setting does not seem
obvious.
The following proposition gives upper bounds on the cardi-
nalities of alphabets U , V and W . The proof, which is given
in Appendix C, relies on Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory’s
theorem and follow standard cardinality bounding argument
(see [55, Appendix C]).
Proposition 1: In the inner region Rin given by Theorem 1,
it suffices to consider sets U , V and W such that ‖U‖ ≤
‖A‖+ 5, ‖V‖ ≤ (‖A‖+ 5)(‖A‖+ 3) and ‖W‖ ≤ ‖C‖+ 3.
The following theorem gives an outer bound on region
R∗ i.e., it defines region Rout ⊃ R∗. The proof is given in
Appendix D.
Theorem 2: Region R∗ is included in Rout, defined as the
closure of the set of all tuples (RA, RC , D,∆) ∈ R4+ such that
there exist random variables U , V , W on some finite sets U ,
V , W , respectively, and a function Aˆ : V ×W → A satisfying
p(wace) = p(w|c)p(ace), p(uvace) = p(u|v)p(v|a)p(ace),
and
RA ≥ I(V ;A|W ) ,
RC ≥ I(W ;C|V ) ,
RA +RC ≥ I(VW ;AC) ,
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
,
∆ ≤ H(A|VW ) + I(A;W |U)− I(A;E|U) ,
∆−RC ≤ H(A|V )− I(A;E|U)− I(W ;C|V ) .
As in the classical multiterminal source coding setup [4],
the outer region resembles the inner region except that it is
convex without time-sharing and that Markov chain conditions
W −
−C −
− (A,E) and U −
−V −
−A−
− (C,E) are weaker
than the long Markov chain of Theorem 1 (compare Fig. 2
and 4, and see Appendix A-B for details on such graphical
representations).
C. Special Case: Lossless Reconstruction of A
In case of lossless reconstruction of A at Bob,1 if Eve has
no side information (E = ∅), then point (I) yields the optimal
1This case is included in the general setup choosing d as the Kronecker
delta and D = 0.
(I)
(II)
(III)
RA
RC
Figure 5: Projection on the plane ∆ = 0.
(I)
(II)
(III)
RC
∆
Figure 6: Projection on the plane RA = 0.
performance choosing auxiliary variables U = ∅ and V = A
i.e., using Wyner-Ahlswede-Körner coding [2], [3], as stated
by Tandon et al. [53, Theorem 1]: In this case, region R∗
writes as the closure of the set of all tuples (RA, RC , D =
0,∆) ∈ R4+ such that there exists a random variable W on
some finite set W s.t. W −
− C −
− A form a Markov chain
and
RA ≥ H(A|W ) ,
RC ≥ I(W ;C) ,
∆ ≤ I(A;W ) .
D. Joint Estimation and Equivocation of Both Sources
Definition 2 only involves the distortion level at Bob and
the equivocation rate at Eve about Alice’s source. As a matter
of fact, the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 can be used to
obtain inner and outer bounds on the achievable region when
also considering a distortion constraint on Charlie’s source at
Bob. This requires the following additional inequality in the
definition of the achievability:
E
[
dC
(
Cn, gC(fA(A
n), fC(C
n))
)]
≤ DC + ε ,
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Figure 7: Secure lossy source coding with uncoded side information.
for some distortion measure dC and decoding function gC . The
resulting bounds will only differ from the ones of Theorems 1
and 2 by adding the following inequality:
DC ≥ E
[
dC(C, Cˆ(V,W ))
]
,
for some function Cˆ : V×W → C. For the sake of readability,
we did not include this fifth dimension in the main definitions.
In Section IV, we remove the distortion, addressing the case of
lossless reconstruction of both sources, and prove that region
Rin yields an optimal characterization of the corresponding
achievable region.
Furthermore, the joint equivocation rate writes:
1
n
H(AnCn|fA(A
n), En) =
1
n
H(An|fA(A
n), En)
+
1
n
H(Cn|AnEn) ,
and the last term 1
n
H(Cn|AnEn) is constant i.e., indepen-
dent of the coding scheme. Hence, the results involving
1
n
H(An|fA(A
n), En) directly apply to the joint equivocation
rate.
III. SECURE LOSSY SOURCE CODING WITH UNCODED
SIDE INFORMATION
A. Definitions
In this section, we consider the special case depicted in
Fig. 7 where Bob has access to uncoded side information i.e.,
Bob and Charlie are collocated. We need the following new
definitions:
Definition 3: An (n,RA)-code for source coding in this
setup is defined by
• An encoding function at Alice f : An → {1, . . . , 2nRA},
• A decoding function at Bob g : {1, . . . , 2nRA} × Cn →
An.
Definition 4: A tuple (RA, D,∆) ∈ R3+ is said to be
achievable if, for any ε > 0, there exists an (n,RA+ ε)-code
(f, g) such that:
E
[
d
(
An, g(f(An), Cn)
)]
≤ D + ε ,
1
n
H(An|f(An), En) ≥ ∆− ε .
The set of all such achievable tuples is denoted by R∗uncoded
and is referred to as the rate-distortion-equivocation region.
(I)(II)
(III)
RA
∆
Figure 8: Projection on the plane RC = 0.
B. Optimal Characterization
In the setup considered in this section, the following theo-
rem provides a single-letter characterization of regionR∗uncoded.
The achievability follows from the one of Theorem 1, choosing
auxiliary variable W = C, and removing constraints on RC
(letting RC tend to ∞) i.e., from the achievability of point (I)
(see Fig. 8). A new proof is needed for the converse part (see
Appendix E).
Note that if Eve is a legitimate decoder that wishes to
estimate source A within a certain distortion criterion (in-
stead of an eavesdropper that other terminals must contend
with), then [19] provides inner and outer bounds on the
corresponding rate-distortion function (with two decoders and
side-information). Finding an optimal characterization of the
achievable region in such a case is still an open problem.
Theorem 3: Region R∗uncoded writes as the closure of the set
of all tuples (RA, D,∆) ∈ R3+ such that there exist random
variables U , V on some finite sets U , V , respectively, and a
function Aˆ : V × C → A such that U −
− V −
−A−
− (C,E)
form a Markov chain and
RA ≥ I(V ;A|C) , (7)
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,C))
]
, (8)
∆ ≤ H(A|V C) + I(A;C|U) − I(A;E|U) . (9)
Comments similar to the ones of Section II-B about Theo-
rem 1 are also relevant here: Equations (7) and (8) are classical
in rate-distortion theory, Alice can exploit the admissible
distortion at Bob to increase the equivocation rate at Eve (see
term H(A|V C) in Equation (9)), and auxiliary variable U can
be tuned to maximize I(A;C|U)− I(A;E|U).
7The following proposition gives upper bounds on the car-
dinalities of alphabets U and V . The proof is similar to the
one of Proposition 1 (given in Appendix C) and is therefore
omitted.
Proposition 2: In the single-letter characterization of the
rate-distortion-equivocation region R∗uncoded given by Theo-
rem 3, it suffices to consider sets U and V such that ‖U‖ ≤
‖A‖+ 2 and ‖V‖ ≤ (‖A‖+ 2)(‖A‖+ 1).
C. Alternative Characterization
The following proposition can be easily proved from The-
orem 3.
Proposition 3: Region R∗uncoded writes as the closure of the
set of all tuples (RA, D,∆) ∈ R3+ such that there exist random
variables U , V on some finite sets U , V , respectively, and a
function Aˆ : V × C → A such that U −
− V −
−A−
− (C,E)
form a Markov chain and
RA ≥
[
I(U ;C)− I(U ;E)
]
+
+ I(V ;A|C) , (10)
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,C))
]
, (11)
∆ ≤ H(A|V C) + I(A;C|U)− I(A;E|U) . (12)
Proof: Inequalities (10)–(12) yield a smaller region than
(7)–(9). The achievability of the above proposition thus fol-
lows from the one of Theorem 3.
Notice that the r.h.s. of (9) and (12) writes
H(A|V C) + I(A;C)− I(A;E) −
[
I(U ;C)− I(U ;E)
]
.
Maximizing this term w.r.t. U thus boils down to minimizing
I(U ;C) − I(U ;E). In the worst case, setting U = ∅ makes
this term zero, meaning that the optimal choice U∗ always
leads to I(U∗;C) − I(U∗;E) ≤ 0, and makes Equations (7)
and (10) identical.
Proposition 3, along with the above proof, indicates that
the optimal choice of U is a random variable U∗ that can be
decoded by Eve. Since minimizing quantity I(U ;C)−I(U ;E)
w.r.t. U corresponds to looking for a part of V which conveys
more information about E than C, this common message
should however give little information to Eve.
D. Special Cases of Interest
1) Lossless secure source coding: In case of lossless recon-
struction of A at Bob, the following corollary directly follows
from Theorem 3.
Corollary 1: In case of lossless reconstruction of A at Bob,
region R∗uncoded reduces to the closure of the set of all tuples
(RA, D = 0,∆) ∈ R3+ such that there exists a random variable
U on some finite set U , such that U −
−A−
− (C,E) form a
Markov chain and
RA ≥ H(A|C) ,
∆ ≤ I(A;C|U)− I(A;E|U) .
Remark 6: In case of a noiseless public link of unlimited
capacity i.e., RA → ∞, the authors of [51] studied the so-
called leakage rate, defined as lim inf 1
n
I(An; JEn), which
equals H(A)−∆. Their result “When Bob remains silent” [51,
Theorem 1] thus follows as a special case of Corollary 1.
2) Bob has less noisy side information than Eve (C A E):
Corollary 2: If Bob has less noisy side information than
Eve, then region R∗uncoded reduces to the closure of the set
of all tuples (RA, D,∆) ∈ R3+ such that there exist a random
variable V on some finite set V , and a function Aˆ : V×C → A
such that V −
−A−
− (C,E) form a Markov chain and
RA ≥ I(V ;A|C) ,
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,C))
]
,
∆ ≤ H(A|V C) + I(A;C) − I(A;E) .
In this case, random variable U of Theorem 3 is set to
a constant value, and hence Wyner-Ziv coding [8] achieves
the whole region. Also note that, by the Markov condition,
the upper bound on the equivocation rate can be written as
H(A|E) − I(V ;A|C), emphasizing that the reduction of the
equivocation at Eve is equivalent to the amount of information
I(V ;A|C) transmitted by Alice.
3) Eve has less noisy side information than Bob (E A C):
Corollary 3: If Eve has less noisy side information than
Bob, then region R∗uncoded reduces to the closure of the set
of all tuples (RA, D,∆) ∈ R3+ such that there exist a random
variable V on some finite set V , and a function Aˆ : V×C → A
such that V −
−A−
− (C,E) form a Markov chain and
RA ≥ I(V ;A|C) ,
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,C))
]
,
∆ ≤ H(A|V E) .
In this case, random variable U of Theorem 3 is set to V ,
and hence Wyner-Ziv coding [8] achieves the whole region.
The equivocation rate at Eve corresponds to the case where
Eve can reliably decode V . Here, Alice can only exploit the
available distortion at Bob to achieve a non-zero equivocation
rate at Eve.
IV. SECURE DISTRIBUTED LOSSLESS COMPRESSION
A. Definitions
In this section, we consider the case where Bob wants to
perfectly reconstruct both sources A and C, from messages
J and K i.e., distributed lossless compression, as depicted in
Fig. 9. We need the following new definitions:
Definition 5: An (n,RA, RC)-code for distributed com-
pression in this setup is defined by
• An encoding function at Alice denoted by fA : An →
{1, . . . , 2nRA},
• An encoding function at Charlie denoted by fC : Cn →
{1, . . . , 2nRC},
• A decoding function at Bob denoted by g :
{1, . . . , 2nRA} × {1, . . . , 2nRC} → An × Cn.
Definition 6: A tuple (RA, RC ,∆) ∈ R3+ is said to be
achievable if, for any ε > 0, there exists an (n,RA+ ε,RC +
ε)-code (fA, fC , g) such that:
Pr {g(fA(A
n), fC(C
n)) 6= (An, Cn)} ≤ ε ,
1
n
H(An|fA(A
n), En) ≥ ∆− ε .
8An Alice
Cn Charlie
Bob (Aˆn, Cˆn) ≈ (An, Cn)
EveEn 1nH(A
n|JEn) & ∆
J (rate RA)
K (rate RC )
Figure 9: Secure distributed lossless compression.
The set of all such achievable tuples is denoted by R∗lossless and
is referred to as the compression-equivocation rates region.
B. Optimal Characterization
In the setup considered in this section, the following theo-
rem provides a single-letter characterization of region R∗lossless.
The achievability follows from the one of Points (I) and
(II), choosing auxiliary variables V = A and W = C (see
Section II-B). A new proof is needed for the converse part
(see Appendix F).
Theorem 4: Region R∗lossless writes as the closure of the
set of all tuples (RA, RC ,∆) ∈ R3+ such that there exists a
random variable U on some finite set U verifying the Markov
chain U −
−A−
− (C,E), and the following inequalities:
RA ≥ H(A|C) , (13)
RC ≥ H(C|U) , (14)
RA +RC ≥ H(AC) , (15)
∆ ≤ I(A;C|U)− I(A;E|U) . (16)
Inequalities (13)–(15) resemble the ones of Slepian and
Wolf [1, Section III]. They ensure perfect reconstruction of
both variables A and C at Bob. Depending on the distribution
of (A,C,E), variable U can be tuned to allow non-zero
equivocation rate at Eve (see Equation (16)). If the side
information at Eve E is less noisy than C i.e., E A C, then
setting U = A is optimal, and hence Slepian-Wolf coding
achieves the whole region (with ∆ = 0).
In case of uncoded side information at Bob, Theorem 4
directly yields Corollary 1 letting RC tend to infinity.
Remark 7: As a matter of fact, the above result refines
recent ones [35], [54] which only provide inner and outer
bounds on R∗lossless. It should be mentioned here that the outer
bound of [35, Chapter 8], [52], [54] is incorrect. We use [54]
as the main reference, but comments below also apply to [35,
Chapter 8] and [52] as well. In [54], Equation (5) writes
∆ ≥ [H(A|E) − RA]+, meaning that points with ∆ = 0
are not always included in the considered region, while zero
equivocation rate is achievable by any coding scheme. This
inequality can thus not be proved in the converse part. In fact,
Equation (29) is derived using H(AN |EN , J) ≤ ∆, while
only the reverse inequality holds.
C. Alternative Characterization
As in Section III for lossy source coding with uncoded
side information, here we can also provide an alternative
characterization of region R∗lossless. The achievability follows
from the one of Theorem 4. A new proof is needed for the
converse part (see Appendix G).
Proposition 4: Region R∗lossless writes as the closure of the
set of all tuples (RA, RC ,∆) ∈ R3+ such that there exists a
random variable U on some finite set U s.t. U −
−A−
− (C,E)
form a Markov chain and
RA ≥
[
I(U ;C)− I(U ;E)
]
+
+H(A|C) , (17)
RC ≥ H(C|U) , (18)
RA +RC ≥ H(AC) , (19)
∆ ≤ I(A;C|U)− I(A;E|U) . (20)
This new single-letter characterization means that giving
U to Eve is also optimal. The corresponding additional rate
[I(U ;C) − I(U ;E)]+ does not lead to a lower equivocation
at Eve. This should be considered with reference to known
results on the wiretap channel [28], [34], where the so called
common message can be chosen so that Eve also decodes it,
without changing the achievable region.
V. APPLICATION EXAMPLES
A. Gaussian Sources with Coded Side Information
Consider the source model depicted in Fig. 10 where the
source at Alice is standard Gaussian, and observations at
Charlie and Eve are the outputs of independent additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels with input A, gains ρC ,
ρE , and noise powers (1 − ρ2C), (1 − ρ2E), resp., for some
0 < ρC , ρE < 1.
Although Theorem 1 is stated and proved for finite alphabet
sources, we take the liberty to use its statement, with the
appropriate quadratic distortion measure i.e., the Euclidean
distance on R (d(a, b) = (a − b)2, for each a, b ∈ R),
as an achievable region also for Gaussian sources (using
differential entropy h(·), and considering any equivocation
rates ∆ ∈ R). In this setup, the rates-distortion-equivocation
region is denoted by R∗Gaussian. Notice that the results should
be generalizable to more general cases of continuous-alphabet
sources.
Proposition 5 below provides an inner bound on R∗Gaussian
based on the achievability of point (I) (see Section II-B) with
9A ∼ N (0, 1)
ρC
×
NC ∼ N (0, 1− ρ
2
C)
+ C
ρE
×
NE ∼ N (0, 1− ρ
2
E)
+ E
Figure 10: A model for Gaussian sources.
Gaussian auxiliary variables. This choice is motivated by [10,
Theorem 1] where Oohama proved that it is optimal when
only one source is to be estimated within a certain distortion
level (with no security constraint).
Proposition 5: In the Gaussian setup considered in this
section, a tuple (RA, RC , D,∆) ∈ R2+×R∗+×R is achievable
if:
RA ≥
1
2
[
log
(
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2RC
D
)]
+
,
∆ ≤
1
2
log
(
2πe(1− ρ2E)
)
−
1
2
min
{[
log
(
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2RC
D
)]
+
;
log
(
1 + (1− ρ2E)
[
1
D
−
1
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2RC
]
+
)}
.
Fig. 11 shows a numerical evaluation of the above inner
region setting ρC = 0.8, ρE = 0.6 and D = 0.1.
Proof: Corner point (I) defines a region R(I) given by
the following inequalities (see Table I in Section II-B):
RA ≥ I(V ;A|W ) , (21)
RC ≥ I(W ;C) , (22)
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
, (23)
∆ ≤ h(A|V W ) + I(A;W |U)− I(A;E|U) . (24)
For some fixed RC ≥ 0 and D > 0, auxiliary random
variables U , V and W are chosen so that bounds on RA
and ∆ given by Proposition 5 yields a point (RA, RC , D,∆)
in region R(I). More precisely, function Aˆ is chosen as the
minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator of A given V
and W , and auxiliary variables V and W are defined as the
outputs of independent AWGN channels with respective inputs
A and C. The gains of these two channels are tuned to meet
constraints (22) and (23), respectively. Then, since variables
A, E and W are Gaussian, either W A E, or E A W .
The upper bound (24) is thus maximized setting U = ∅, or
U = V .
1) Variable W–Rate at Charlie: We first define ρW ∈ [0, 1)
by ρ2W = 1 − 2−2RC , and choose random variable W as
follows:
W = ρWC +NW ,
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1
2
3
4
5
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
RA
RC
∆
Figure 11: Achievable tuples in the quadratic Gaussian case
(ρC = 0.8, ρE = 0.6, D = 0.1).
where NW ∼ N (0, 1− ρ2W ) is an independent random noise.
With these definitions,
I(W ;C) =
1
2
log
(
1
Var [C|W ]
)
=
1
2
log
(
1
1− ρ2W
)
= RC .
2) Variable V –Distortion at Bob and Rate at Alice: We
then define ρV ∈ [0, 1) by
ρ2V =
{
1−(ρW ρC)
2−D
1−(ρW ρC)2−D(ρW ρC)2
if D < 1− (ρW ρC)2 ,
0 otherwise.
(25)
and choose random variable V as follows:
W = ρVA+NV ,
where NV ∼ N (0, 1 − ρ2V ) is an independent random noise.
Note that if large distortion levels are allowed, then Alice will
not transmit anything (V = ∅).
With these definitions,
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
= Var [A|VW ]
=
(1− ρ2V )(1− (ρW ρC)
2)
1− (ρV ρWρC)2
≤ D ,
and
I(V ;A|W ) =
1
2
log
(
Var [A|W ]
Var [A|VW ]
)
=
1
2
log
(
1− (ρW ρC)2
Var [A|V W ]
)
=
1
2
[
log
(
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2RC
D
)]
+
.
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3) Variable U–Equivocation Rate at Eve: The above rates
and distortion level can be achieved with the following equiv-
ocation rate, depending on the choice of U :
• If U = ∅:
h(A|VW ) + I(A;W |U)− I(A;E|U)
= h(A|E) − I(V ;A|W )
=
1
2
log
(
2πe(1− ρ2E)
)
−
1
2
[
log
(
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2RC
D
)]
+
.
• If U = V :
h(A|VW ) + I(A;W |U)− I(A;E|U)
= h(A|E) − I(V ;A|E)
=
1
2
log
(
2πe(1− ρ2E)
)
−
1
2
log
(
1− (ρV ρE)2
1− ρ2V
)
=
1
2
log
(
2πe(1− ρ2E)
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + (1 − ρ2E)
[
1
D
−
1
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2RC
]
+
)
,
where the last equality follows from definition (25) after
some straightforward derivations.
This proves Proposition 5.
If Eve has no side information i.e., ρE = 0, then the inner
bound given by Proposition 5, and corresponding to Oohama
coding [10], is optimal.
Proposition 6: If ρE = 0, then region R∗Gaussian reduces to
the set of all tuples (RA, RC , D,∆) ∈ R2+×R∗+×R verifying
the following inequalities:
RA ≥
1
2
[
log
(
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2RC
D
)]
+
,
∆ ≤
1
2
log(2πe)−
1
2
[
log
(
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2RC
D
)]
+
.
Proof: The achievability follows from Proposition 5.
The proof of the converse part follows the argument of [10].
Let (RA, RC , D,∆) ∈ R∗Gaussian and ε > 0. There exists an
(n,RA + ε,RC + ε)-code (fA, fC , g) s.t.:
E
[
d
(
An, g(fA(A
n), fC(C
n))
)]
≤ D + ε ,
1
n
h(An|fA(A
n), En) =
1
n
h(An|fA(A
n)) ≥ ∆− ε .
Denote by J = fA(An) and K = fC(Cn) the messages
transmitted by Alice and Charlie, respectively.
1) Rate at Alice: The rate at Alice verifies the following
sequence of inequalities:
n(RA + ε) ≥ H(J)
≥ I(J ;An|K)
≥ h(An|K)− h(An|JK) .
We now study each term of the r.h.s. of the above equation.
First, note that from the Gaussian distribution of (A,C) and
K = fC(C
n), there exists random variables NA,i ∼ N (0, 1−
ρ2C), independent of Cn (and hence of K) such that Ai =
ρCCi+NA,i, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The conditional entropy
power inequality (EPI) [55], [56] thus yields
2
2
n
h(An|K) ≥ 2
2
n
h(ρCC
n|K) + 2
2
n
h(NnA|K)
= ρ2C 2
2
n
h(Cn|K) + 2πe(1− ρ2C) . (26)
On the other hand, the rate at Charlie can be lower bounded
as follows:
n(RC + ε) ≥ H(K)
= I(K;Cn)
= h(Cn)− h(Cn|K) .
Equation (26) thus yields
2
2
n
h(An|K) ≥ ρ2C 2
2
n
(h(Cn)−n(RC+ε)) + 2πe(1− ρ2C)
= ρ2C 2πe 2
−2(RC+ε) + 2πe(1− ρ2C) .
Term h(An|JK) can be easily upper bounded:
h(An|JK)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
h(Ai|JKA
i−1)
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
h(Ai|J,K)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
log (2πeVar [Ai|J,K])
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
log
(
2πeE(Ai − gi(J,K))
2
)
(d)
≤
n
2
log
(
2πe
n
n∑
i=1
E(Ai − gi(J,K))
2
)
(e)
≤
n
2
log (2πe(D + ε)) ,
where
• step (a) follows from the chain rule for conditional
entropy,
• step (b) from the fact that conditioning reduces the
entropy,
• step (c) from the fact Var [Ai|J,K] is the minimum mean
square error (over all possible estimators of Ai), for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• step (d) from the fact that function log(·) is concave, and
Jensen inequality,
• step (e) from the distortion constraint (26).
Putting everything together, we proved that
n(RA + ε) ≥ h(A
n|K)− h(An|JK)
≥
n
2
log
(
ρ2C 2πe 2
−2(RC+ε) + 2πe(1− ρ2C)
)
−
n
2
log (2πe(D + ε))
=
n
2
log
(
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2(RC+ε)
D + ε
)
.
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2) Equivocation Rate at Eve: The above argument also
provides an upper bound on the equivocation rate:
n(∆− ε) ≤ h(An)−H(J)
≤
n
2
log (2πe)−
n
2
log
(
1− ρ2C + ρ
2
C 2
−2(RC+ε)
D + ε
)
.
This proves Proposition 6.
Remark 8: In case of uncoded side information at Bob i.e.,
RC → ∞, the inner bound provided by Proposition 5 is
optimal if ρC ≥ ρE i.e., C A E. The authors conjecture
that it also holds if ρC < ρE , while the proof seems more
tricky.
A
0
1
C
0
e
1
E
0
1
1− p
p
p
1− p
1− ǫ
ǫ
ǫ
1− ǫ
Figure 12: Binary source with BEC/BSC side informations.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
0 2p 4p(1− p) h2(p) 1 ǫ
Figure 13: The different regions as a function of ǫ.
B. Binary Source with (Uncoded) BEC/BSC Side Informations
Consider the source model depicted in Fig. 12 where the
source is binary and the side information at Bob, resp. Eve, is
the output of a binary erasure channel (BEC) with erasure
probability ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2], resp. a binary symmetric channel
(BSC) with crossover probability p ∈ [0, 1/2], with input A.
This model is of interest since neither Bob nor Eve can
always be a lessnoisy decoder for all values of (p, ǫ). Let
h2 denote the binary entropy function given by h2(x) =
−x log(x) − (1 − x) log(1 − x). According to the values of
the parameters (p, ǫ), it can be shown by means of standard
manipulations [57] that the broadcast channel with input A and
outputs (C,E) satisfies the following properties (see Fig. 13):
(a) 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 2p: The side information E is a stochastically
degraded version of C,
(b) 2p ≤ ǫ ≤ 4p(1 − p): The side information C is less
noisy than E i.e., C A E,
(c) 4p(1−p) ≤ ǫ ≤ h2(p): The side information C is more
capable than E, i.e., I(A;C) ≥ I(A;E),
(d) h2(p) < ǫ ≤ 1: Any of the above relations hold between
the side informations C and E.
Corollary 2 thus provides an optimal characterization of
the rate-distortion-equivocation region R∗uncoded when ǫ lies in
region (a) or (b). Otherwise, only Theorem 3 applies for the
general case and variable U is neither constant nor equal to
V .
A
0
1
V
0
1
U
0
1
1− α
α
α
1− α
1− β
β
β
1− β
Figure 14: Binary auxiliary random variables.
From now on, let the distortion function at Bob d be the
Hamming distance and assume for simplicity that the source is
uniformly distributed, i.e., Pr {A = 0} = Pr {A = 1} = 1/2.
We know from the cardinality constraints given in Proposi-
tion 2 that it suffices to consider sets U and V such that
‖U‖ ≤ 4 and ‖V‖ ≤ 12. As a matter of fact, according
to the following proposition, we can restrict our attention to
the auxiliary variables (U, V ) obtained as the outputs of a
degraded binary symmetric broadcast channel with input A, as
depicted in Fig. 14. Notice that V is identical to the auxiliary
variable used by Wyner and Ziv [8] for the rate-distortion
function of a binary source in the case where there is no
eavesdropper.
Proposition 7: In the case considered in this section, region
R∗uncoded reduces to the set of all tuples (RA, D,∆) ∈ R3+ such
that there exist α, β ∈ [0, 1/2] satisfying
RA ≥ ǫ (1− h2(α)) ,
D ≥ ǫ α ,
∆ ≤ ǫ h2(α) + (1− ǫ)h2(α ⋆ β)− h2(p ⋆ α ⋆ β) + h2(p) .
Proof: The achievability part of Proposition 7 is a direct
application of Theorem 3: define auxiliary random variables
U and V as depicted in Fig. 14, and function Aˆ on V × C =
{0, 1} × {0, e, 1} by
Aˆ(v, c) =
{
c if c 6= e ,
v otherwise .
Expressions of Proposition 7 follow after some straightforward
derivations.
The converse part needs more arguments. Let (RA, D,∆)
be an achievable tuple. From Theorem 3, there exist finite
sets U , V , random variables U on U , V on V and a function
Aˆ : V → A, s.t. U −
− V −
− A −
− (C,E) form a Markov
chain and
RA ≥ ǫ I(V ;A) ,
D ≥ ǫE
[
d(A, Aˆ(V ))
]
,
∆ ≤ ǫH(A|V ) + (1 − ǫ)H(A|U)−H(E|U) + h2(p) .
The proof of the above expressions is straightforward, and
hence it is omitted here. We now prove that there exist α, β ∈
[0, 1/2] satisfying the inequalities of Proposition 7:
1) Rate: Random variable A is uniformly distributed on
{0; 1}, thus:
I(V ;A) = H(A)−H(A|V )
= 1−H(A|V ) .
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Table II: Some achievable tuples and corresponding parameters for auxiliary random variables (p = 0.1, ǫ = h2(p) ≈ 0.469).
Secure source coding Slepian-Wolf Secure source coding Wyner-Ziv
Rate R 0.469 0.469 0.375 0.375
Distortion D 0 0 0.015 0.015
Equivocation Rate ∆ 0.039 0 0.133 0.126
α 0 0 0.031 0.031
β 0.078 0 0.050 0
Since 0 ≤ H(A|V ) ≤ H(A) = 1, and function h2 is a
continuous one-to-one mapping from [0, 1/2] to [0, 1], there
exists α ∈ [0, 1/2] such that H(A|V ) = h2(α), and
I(V ;A) = 1− h2(α) .
2) Distortion at Bob: Since distortion d is the Hamming
distance, we can write:
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V ))
]
= Pr
{
Aˆ(V ) 6= A
}
,
and, from Fano’s inequality [56]:
h2
(
Pr
{
Aˆ(V ) 6= A
})
+ Pr
{
Aˆ(V ) 6= A
}
log(‖A‖ − 1)
≥ H(A|V ) ,
i.e.,
h2
(
Pr
{
Aˆ(V ) 6= A
})
≥ h2(α) .
Function h2 is increasing on [0, 1/2], and α ∈ [0, 1/2]. The
last inequality thus implies
Pr
{
Aˆ(V ) 6= A
}
≥ α .
3) Equivocation Rate at Eve: Define r.v. Vˆ on {0, 1} as
the output of a BSC with crossover probability α and input A.
Since A is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}, A is also the output
of a BSC with crossover probability α and input Vˆ . From Mrs.
Gerber’s lemma [58], we can write, for each u ∈ U :
H(A|U = u) = h2
(
α ⋆ h−12
(
H(Vˆ |U = u)
))
,
and hence,
H(A|U) =
∑
u∈U
h2
(
α ⋆ h−12
(
H(Vˆ |U = u)
))
p(u) .
Following the same argument, since E is the output of a BSC
with crossover probability p and input A, it is also the output
of a BSC with crossover probability p ⋆ α and input Vˆ , and:
H(E|U) =
∑
u∈U
h2
(
(p ⋆ α) ⋆ h−12
(
H(Vˆ |U = u)
))
p(u) .
Now, for each u ∈ U , 0 ≤ H(Vˆ |U = u) ≤ H(Vˆ ) ≤ 1, and
there exists βu ∈ [0, 1/2] such that H(Vˆ |U = u) = h2(βu).
Consequently,
(1− ǫ)H(A|U)−H(E|U)
=
∑
u∈U
[
(1− ǫ)h2(α ⋆ βu)− h2(p ⋆ α ⋆ βu)
]
p(u)
≤ (1 − ǫ)h2(α ⋆ β)− h2(p ⋆ α ⋆ β) ,
where β = βu∗ for some u∗ ∈ U .
This proves Proposition 7.
Remark 9: In this binary case with Hamming distance as
distortion measure, an achievable distortion level D is an upper
bound on the average bit error rate (BER) at Bob (while
estimating A):
E
[
d(An, g(f(An), Cn))
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr
{
Aˆi 6= Ai
}
,
where Aˆi , gi(fA(An), Cn) is the i-th coordinate of the
estimate of An at Bob. At the same time, an achievable
equivocation rate ∆ provides a lower bound on the BER at
Eve, as shown by the following sequence of inequalities:
1
n
H(An|JEn)
(a)
≤
1
n
H(An|A˘n)
(b)
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Ai|A˘i)
(c)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Wi|A˘i) +H(Ai|WiA˘i)
(d)
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Wi)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
h2
(
Pr
{
A˘i 6= Ai
})
(e)
≤ h2
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr
{
A˘i 6= Ai
})
,
where
• step (a) holds for any A˘n ∈ An such that A˘n−
−(J,En)−

−An form a Markov chain,
• step (b) follows from the chain rule for conditional
entropy and the fact that conditioning reduces the entropy,
• step (c) from Wi , Ai ⊕ A˘i, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• step (d) from identity Ai = Wi ⊕ A˘i and the fact that
conditioning reduces the entropy,
• step (e) from the fact that function h2 is concave, and
Jensen inequality.
Numerical evaluation: Using the inequalities of Proposi-
tion 7, we now numerically compute some achievable tuples
for p = 0.1 and ǫ = h2(p) ≈ 0.469 (see Fig. 15). In case
of lossless compression (columns #1 and #2 of Table II),
the auxiliary random variable V is set to A i.e., α = 0.
Variable U actually enables a non-zero equivocation level.
Now assume that the coding rate is limited to a maximum
of 80% of the required rate for perfect reconstruction of the
source (column #3). This induces a distortion of 0.015 at Bob
and an equivocation rate of 0.133 bits at Eve. Even a small
increase in the distortion at Bob can be fully exploited by
Alice to achieve very significant gains (more than third times
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Figure 15: Equivocation rate at Eve as a function of the
distortion level at Bob (p = 0.1, ǫ = h2(p) ≈ 0.469).
in this case) in terms of equivocation rate at Eve. Moreover, for
distortion levels higher than 0.036, Wyner-Ziv coding actually
achieves the optimal performance, as shown in Fig. 15.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we have addressed the general problem of
secure lossy source coding with coded side information. Inner
and outer bounds on the corresponding achievable region have
been derived. This setting can be seen as the natural extension
of the Berger et al. problem [5] by taking the security
requirements into account. It should be mentioned here that
the latter is a fundamental information-theoretic problem for
which the best known inner bound is not optimal in general.
In the same way, our proposed bounds do not match in
general, but the achievable inner region turns to be optimal for
two cases of particular interest. Namely, secure lossy source
coding with uncoded side information, and secure distributed
lossless compression. Interestingly enough, it is proved for
both cases that there is no loss in coding to provide a common
description of the source to both receivers, the legitimate one
and the eavesdropper. The remaining information is intended
to the legitimate receiver and considered at the eavesdropper
as “raw” bits. Furthermore, under certain conditions (e.g., less
noisy), the standalone Wyner-Ziv (or Slepian-Wolf) coding
scheme can achieve the entire region and hence the highest
security is guaranteed without additional efforts.
Application examples to secure lossy source coding of
Gaussian and binary sources have been considered. The binary
model is of interest since neither Bob nor Eve can always be
a lessnoisy decoder and thus the encoding strategy needed
to achieve the whole region is rather novel. In the Gaussian
quadratic case, the results by Oohama [10] suggest an inner
bound which has been proved to be optimal in some cases.
A deep analysis along with recent extremal inequalities [59],
[60] may yield the expected converse. However, in the light
of known results on Gaussian quadratic multiterminal com-
pression [10], [11], [20], [21], [61], this might be a tricky
problem.
Several possible extensions of this work can be identi-
fied. First of all, we can think about an extension of the
CEO problem [62], [63] under some security constraints,
where the purpose of the legitimate decoder is to estimate
a common underlying random variable. Recent results [64]
indicate that Wyner-Ziv-like coding works well in this setup,
and the quadratic Gaussian case has already been solved by
Oohama [65]. Since the quantity of interest is the underlying
variable, the secrecy of the system could be measured by the
equivocation at the eavesdropper about this variable rather than
the observation of one encoder.
Further extensions could include the introduction of mul-
tiple eavesdroppers in order to consider the fact that the
encoder cannot reliably know the statistics of the information
at the eavesdropper. As a matter of fact, if the observations
of these multiple eavesdroppers are degraded (or maybe less
noisy), as it will be the case with scalar Gaussian variables,
then a multi-layer superposition coding scheme may yield a
characterization of the equivocation rate at each eavesdropper.
Through this work, error-free rate-limited links were as-
sumed between the encoders and receivers, while noisy chan-
nels could provide additional security, as in the traditional
wiretap setting. A result of optimality for the case of degraded
channels and side informations has already been derived [49].
A comprehensive study of the more general setup of secure
joint source/channel coding seems promising.
APPENDIX A
USEFUL NOTIONS AND RESULTS
The appendices below provide basic notions on some con-
cepts used in this paper.
A. Strongly Typical Sequences and Delta-Convention
Following [66], we use in this paper strongly typical sets and
the so-called Delta-Convention. Some useful facts are recalled
here. Let X and Y be random variables on some finite sets X
and Y , respectively. We denote by PX,Y (resp. PY |X , and PX )
the joint probability distribution of (X,Y ) (resp. conditional
distribution of Y given X , and marginal distribution of X).
Definition 7: For any sequence xn ∈ Xn and any symbol
a ∈ X , notation N(a|xn) stands for the number of occurrences
of a in xn.
Definition 8: A sequence xn ∈ Xn is called (strongly) δ-
typical w.r.t. X (or simply typical if the context is clear) if∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a|xn)− PX(a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ for each a ∈ X ,
and N(a|xn) = 0 for each a ∈ X such that PX(a) = 0. The
set of all such sequences is denoted by T nδ (X).
Definition 9: Let xn ∈ Xn. A sequence yn ∈ Yn is called
(strongly) δ-typical (w.r.t. Y ) given xn if∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a, b|xn, yn)− 1nN(a|xn)PY |X(b|a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ ,
for each a ∈ X , b ∈ Y and, N(a, b|xn, yn) = 0 for each
a ∈ X , b ∈ Y such that PY |X(b|a) = 0. The set of all such
sequences is denoted by T nδ (Y |xn).
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Delta-Convention [66]: For any sets X , Y , there exists a
sequence {δn}n∈N∗ such that lemmas below hold.2 From now
on, typical sequences are understood with δ = δn. Typical sets
are still denoted by T nδ (·).
Lemma 1 ( [66, Lemma 1.2.12]): There exists a sequence
ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that
PX(T
n
δ (X)) ≥ 1− ηn .
Lemma 2 ( [66, Lemma 1.2.13]): There exists a sequence
ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that, for each xn ∈ T nδ (X),∣∣∣∣ 1n log‖T nδ (X)‖ −H(X)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn ,∣∣∣∣ 1n log‖T nδ (Y |xn)‖ −H(Y |X)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn .
Lemma 3 (Asymptotic equipartition property): There
exists a sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that, for each xn ∈ T nδ (X)
and each yn ∈ T nδ (Y |xn),∣∣∣∣− 1n logPX(xn)−H(X)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn ,∣∣∣∣− 1n logPY |X(yn|xn)−H(Y |X)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn .
Lemma 4 (Joint typicality lemma [55]): There exists a se-
quence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that∣∣∣∣− 1n logPY (T nδ (Y |xn))− I(X ;Y )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn
for each xn ∈ T nδ (X).
Proof:
PY (T
n
δ (Y |x
n)) =
∑
yn∈Tn
δ
(Y |xn)
PY (y
n)
(a)
≤ ‖T nδ (Y |x
n)‖ 2−n[H(Y )−αn]
(b)
≤ 2n[H(Y |X)+βn] 2−n[H(Y )−αn]
= 2−n[I(X;Y )−βn−αn] ,
where
• step (a) follows from the fact that T nδ (Y |xn) ⊂ T nδ (Y )
and Lemma 3, for some sequence αn −−−−→
n→∞
0,
• step (b) from Lemma 2, for some sequence βn −−−−→
n→∞
0.
The reverse inequality PY (T nδ (Y |xn)) ≥ 2−n[I(X;Y )+βn+αn]
can be proved following similar argument.
B. Graphical Representation of Probability Distributions
Following [67, Section II], we use in this paper a technique
based on undirected graphs, that provides a sufficient condi-
tion for establishing Markov chains from a joint distribution.
Such a technique for establishing conditional independence
was introduced in [68] for Bayesian networks, and further
generalized to various types of graphs [69]. This paragraph
recalls the main points of this technique.
2As a matter of fact, δn → 0 and √n δn →∞ as n→∞.
Assume that a sequence of random variables Xn has joint
distribution with the following form:
p(xn) = f1(xS1)f2(xS2) · · · fk(xSk) ,
where, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Si is a subset of {1, . . . , n},
notation xSi stands for collection (xj)j∈Si , and fi is some
nonnegative function.
1) Drawing the graph: Draw an undirected graph where
all involved random variables e.g., (Xj)j∈{1,...,n}, are nodes.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, draw edges between all the nodes in
XSi .
2) Checking Markov relations: Let G1, G2, and G3 be three
disjoint subsets of {1, . . . , n}. If all paths in the graph from
a node in XG1 to a node in XG3 pass through a node in XG2 ,
then XG1 −
−XG2 −
−XG3 form a Markov chain. The proof
of this result can be found in [67] and is omitted here.
C. Csiszár and Körner’s Equality
Lemma 5 (Csiszár and Körner’s equality [28, Lemma 7]):
Consider two i.i.d. sequences Xn and Y n, and a constant C.
The following identity holds true:
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1;Xi|CX
i−1) =
n∑
j=1
I(Xj−1;Yj |CY
n
j+1) .
Proof: From the chain rule for conditional mutual infor-
mation, we can write:
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1;Xi|CX
i−1) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
I(Yj ;Xi|CX
i−1Y nj+1)
=
∑
i,j: i<j
I(Yj ;Xi|CX
i−1Y nj+1)
=
n∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yj |CX
i−1Y nj+1)
=
n∑
j=1
I(Xj−1;Yj |CY
n
j+1) .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 (INNER BOUND)
Let U , V , W be three random variables on finite
sets U , V , W , respectively, such that p(uvwace) =
p(u|v)p(v|a)p(w|c)p(ace), a function Aˆ : V ×W → A, and
a tuple (RA, RC , D,∆) ∈ R4+. In this section, we describe
a scheme that achieves (under some sufficient conditions)
tuple (RA, RC , D,∆) i.e., for any ε > 0, we construct an
(n,RA + ε,RC + ε)-code (fA, fC , g) such that:
E
[
d
(
An, g(fA(A
n), fC(C
n))
)]
≤ D + ε ,
1
n
H(An|fA(A
n), En) ≥ ∆− ε .
In this scheme, Alice (resp. Charlie) transmits to Bob a
compressed version (U, V ), with V on the top of U , (resp.
W ) of A (resp. C) using random binning. From the three bin
indices, Bob jointly decodes variables U , V and W .
Let ε > 0, R1, R2 ∈ R∗+ such that R1 +R2 = RA+ ε, and
S1 ≥ R1, S2 ≥ R2, SC ≥ RC + ε. Define γ = ε8 dmax .
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A. Codebook generation at Alice
Randomly pick 2nS1 sequences un(s1) from T nδ (U) and
divide them into 2nR1 equal size bins {B1(r1)}r1∈{1,...,2nR1}.
Then, for each codeword un(s1), randomly pick 2nS2 se-
quences vn(s1, s2) from T nδ (V |un(s1)) and divide them into
2nR2 equal size bins {B2(s1, r2)}r2∈{1,...,2nR2}.
B. Codebook generation at Charlie
Randomly pick 2nSC sequences wn(s) from T nδ (W )
and divide them into 2n(RC+ε) equal size bins
{BC(r)}r∈{1,...,2n(RC+ε)}.
C. Encoding at Alice
Assume that sequence An is produced at Alice. Look
for the first codeword un(s1) such that (un(s1), An) ∈
T nδ (U,A). Then look for a codeword vn(s1, s2) such
that (vn(s1, s2), An) ∈ T nδ (V,A|un(s1)). Let B1(r1) and
B2(s1, r2) be the bins of un(s1) and vn(s1, s2), respectively.
Alice sends the message J = fA(An) , (r1, r2) on her error-
free link.
D. Encoding at Charlie
Assume that sequence Cn is produced at Charlie. Look for
a codeword wn(s) such that (wn(s), Cn) ∈ T nδ (W,C). Let
BC(r) be the bin of wn(s). Charlie sends the message K =
fC(C
n) , r on his error-free link.
E. Decoding at Bob
Assume that Bob receives J = (r1, r2) from Alice
and K = r from Charlie. Look for the unique jointly
typical codewords (un, vn, wn) with bin indices (r1, r2, r)
i.e., look for the unique indices (s1, s2, s) such that
(un(s1), v
n(s1, s2), w
n(s)) ∈ (B1(r1)×B2(s1, r2)×BC(r))∩
T nδ (U, V,W ). Then compute the estimate g(J,K) ∈ An using
the component-wise relation gi(J,K) , Aˆ(vi(s1, s2), wi(s))
for each i = {1, . . . , n}.
F. Errors and constraints
Denoting by E the event “An error occurred during the
encoding or decoding steps,” we expand its probability (av-
eraged over the set of all possible codebooks) as follows:
Pr {E} ≤ P0 + Pe,1 + Pe,2 + Pe,3 + Pd, where each term
corresponds to a particular error event, as detailed below. We
derive sufficient conditions on the parameters that make each
of these probabilities small.
1) : From standard properties of typical sequences (see
Appendix A-A), there exists a sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such
that P0 , Pr {(An, Cn, En) 6∈ T nδ (A,C,E)} ≤ ηn. Conse-
quently, P0 ≤ γ for some sufficiently large n.
2) : In the first encoding step, Alice needs to find (at least)
one codeword un(s1) such that (un(s1), An) ∈ T nδ (U,A). The
corresponding error probability Pe,1 writes:
Pe,1 , Pr {∄s1 s.t. (un(s1), An) ∈ T nδ (U,A)}
=
(
Pr
{
(Un, An) /∈ T nδ (U,A)
∣∣∣ Un ∈ T nδ (U),
An ∈ T nδ (A)
})2nS1
=
(
1− Pr
{
(Un, An) ∈ T nδ (U,A)
∣∣∣ Un ∈ T nδ (U),
An ∈ T nδ (A)
})2nS1
≤ 2−2
nS1 Pr{(Un,An)∈Tnδ (U,A) | U
n∈Tnδ (U),A
n∈Tnδ (A)}
≤ 2−2
nS12−n(I(U;A)+ηn) ,
for some sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 (see Lemma 4 in Ap-
pendix A-A). If S1 > I(U ;A), then probability Pe,1 vanishes
as n tends to infinity, and hence can be upper bounded by γ
for some sufficiently large n.
Similarly, the second encoding step requires condition S2 >
I(V ;A|U) to succeed with probability 1− Pe,2 ≥ 1− γ.
3) : In his encoding step, Charlie needs to find (at least) one
codeword wn(s) such that (wn(s), Cn) ∈ T nδ (W,C). Follow-
ing the above argument, this requires condition SC > I(W ;C)
to succeed with probability 1− Pe,3 ≥ 1− γ.
4) : The decoding error probability Pd must be carefully
handled. An error occurs when the decoded tuple differ
from the original one (s1, s2, s). There are three meaningful
possible events so that Pd writes:3
Pd , Pr {✘✘✘
✘(s1, s2, s)}
= Pr {{✚s } ∪ {✚s1, sˇ} ∪ {sˇ1,✚s2, sˇ}}
≤ Pr {✚s }+ Pr {✚s1, sˇ}+ Pr {sˇ1,✚s2, sˇ} .
We now study each term of the r.h.s. of the above equation.
Pr {✚s } = Pr
{
∃ s′1, s
′
2, s
′ 6= s s.t. (un(s′1), v
n(s′1, s
′
2), w
n(s′))
∈ (B1(r1)×B2(s
′
1, r2)×BC(r)) ∩ T
n
δ (U, V,W )
}
≤ 2n(S1−R1+S2−R2+SC−RC−ε) × Pr
{
(Un, V n,Wn) ∈
T nδ (U, V,W )
∣∣∣ (Un, V n) ∈ T nδ (U, V ),Wn ∈ T nδ (W )}
≤ 2n(S1−R1+S2−R2+SC−RC−ε) 2−n(I(UV ;W )−ηn)
= 2n(S1−R1+S2−R2+SC−RC−ε−I(V ;W )+ηn) ,
for some sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 (see Lemma 4 in Ap-
pendix A-A). If S1−R1+S2−R2+SC−RC−ε < I(V ;W ),
then the above probability vanishes as n tends to infinity, and
hence can be upper bounded by γ for some sufficiently large
n.
3We denote by sˇ the event “Index s has been correctly decoded”, and✚s its
complement. Same notation holds for indices s1, s2, and any tuple of indices.
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Pr {✚s1, sˇ} = Pr
{
∃ s′1 6= s1, s
′
2 s.t. (u
n(s′1), v
n(s′1, s
′
2), w
n(s))
∈ (B1(r1)×B2(s
′
1, r2)×BC(r)) ∩ T
n
δ (U, V,W )
}
≤ 2n(S1−R1+S2−R2) × Pr
{
(Un, V n,Wn) ∈ T nδ (U, V,W )∣∣∣(Un, V n) ∈ T nδ (U, V ),Wn ∈ T nδ (W )} ,
Following the above argument, if S1 − R1 + S2 − R2 <
I(V ;W ), then the above probability can be upper bounded
by γ for some sufficiently large n.
Pr {sˇ1,✚s2, sˇ}= Pr
{
∃ s′2 6= s2 s.t. (u
n(s1), v
n(s1, s
′
2), w
n(s))
∈ (B1(r1)×B2(s1, r2)×BC(r)) ∩ T
n
δ (U, V,W )
}
≤ 2n(S2−R2) × Pr
{
(Un, V n,Wn) ∈ T nδ (U, V,W )∣∣∣ (Un, V n) ∈ T nδ (U, V ), (Un,Wn) ∈ T nδ (U,W )}
≤ 2n(S2−R2) 2−n(I(V ;W |U)−ηn) ,
for some sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0. If S2 − R2 < I(V ;W |U),
then the above probability vanishes as n tends to infinity, and
hence Pr{sˇ1,✚s2, sˇ} ≤ γ, for some sufficiently large n.
5) Summary: In this paragraph, we proved that under some
sufficient conditions, Pr {E} ≤ 7γ.
G. Distortion at Bob
We now check that our code achieves the required distortion
level at Bob (averaged over the set of all possible codebooks):
E
[
d
(
An,g(fA(A
n), fC(C
n))
)]
≤ Pr {E} dmax+
(1− Pr {E})E
[
d
(
An, Aˆ
(
vn(s1, s2), w
n(s)
))∣∣∣✁E]
≤ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
+
ε
8
+
7ε
8
,
where the last inequality holds for some sufficiently large n,
and follows from Pr {E} ≤ 7γ, the definition of γ, and the
argument below: For each (an, vn, wn) ∈ T nδ (A, V,W ),
d
(
an,Aˆ
(
vn, wn
))
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
d
(
ai, Aˆ
(
vi, wi
))
=
1
n
∑
(a,v,w)∈A×V×W
d
(
a, Aˆ(v, w)
)
N(a, v, w|an, vn, wn)
= E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
+
∑
(a,v,w)∈A×V×W
d
(
a, Aˆ(v, w)
)
×
(
1
n
N(a, v, w|an, vn, wn)− p(a, v, w)
)
≤ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
+ dmax‖A‖‖V‖‖W‖δn ,
where the last inequality holds since (an, vn, wn) ∈
T nδ (A, V,W ). The result follows from the fact that
(An, vn(s1, s2), w
n(s)) ∈ T nδ (A, V,W ) when no error
occurred, and δn −−−−→
n→∞
0 (see the Delta-Convention
in Appendix A-A). For some sufficiently large n,
dmax‖A‖‖V‖‖W‖δn ≤
ε
8 .
Condition D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
is thus sufficient to
achieve distortion D + ε at Bob.
H. Equivocation rate at Eve
The equivocation rate at Eve (averaged over the set of all
possible codebooks) can be lower bounded as follows:
1
n
H(An|fA(A
n), En) =
1
n
H(An|r1r2E
n)
=
1
n
[
H(An|r1E
n)− I(An; r2|r1E
n)
]
(a)
≥
1
n
[
H(An|s1E
n)−H(r2)
]
(b)
≥ H(A|UE)−R2 − ε ,
where
• step (a) follows from the facts that the bin index r1
is a deterministic function of the codeword index s1,
the bin index r2 is a deterministic function of An, and
conditioning reduces the entropy,
• step (b) for some sufficiently large n, from the fact that
the codewords un(s1) are drawn i.i.d. (see Lemma 6
below), and r2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR2}.
Condition ∆ ≤ H(A|UE)−R2 is thus sufficient to achieve
equivocation rate ∆− ε at Eve.
Lemma 6: The following inequality holds for some se-
quence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0:
H(An|s1E
n) ≥ n(H(A|UE)− ηn) .
Proof: Since the codeword index s1 is a deterministic
function of An, term H(An|s1En) writes
H(An|s1E
n) = H(AnEn|s1)−H(E
n|s1)
= H(AnEn)−H(s1)−H(E
n|s1) . (27)
We now study each term of the r.h.s. of the above equation.
Variables Ai, Ei are i.i.d., hence H(AnEn) = nH(AE).
The second term is studied through the distribution of
index s1, using classical argument of typical sequences and
random coding. From the encoding procedure described in
Section B-C, the distribution of s1 writes, for each j ∈
{1, . . . , 2nS1}:
Pr {s1 = j} =
Pr
{
(un(j), An) ∈ T nδ (U,A) ∩
j−1⋂
i=1
((un(i), An) /∈ T nδ (U,A))
}
= tn(1− tn)
j−1 ,
where
tn , Pr
{
(Un, An) ∈ T nδ (U,A)
∣∣∣ Un ∈ T nδ (U), An ∈ T nδ (A)} .
The entropy of index s1 thus writes
H(s1) = −
2nS1∑
j=1
tn(1−tn)
j−1 log(tn(1−tn)
j−1)−Pe,1 log(Pe,1) ,
where Pe,1 is the error probability of this encoding step. From
Section B-F, if S1 > I(U ;A), then probability Pe,1 vanishes
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as n tends to infinity. Since each term tn(1 − tn)j−1 is non-
negative and x log x −−−−→
x→0+
0−, the above entropy can be
upper bounded as follows:
H(s1) ≤ −
∞∑
j=1
tn(1−tn)
j−1 log(tn(1−tn)
j−1)+η(1)n , (28)
for some sequence η(1)n −−−−→
n→∞
0. The above series writes
∞∑
j=1
tn(1− tn)
j−1 log(tn(1− tn)
j−1) = tn log(tn)×
∞∑
j=1
(1− tn)
j−1 + tn log(1 − tn)
∞∑
j=1
(j − 1)(1− tn)
j−1 .
Equation (28) thus yields the following upper bound:
H(s1) ≤ − log(tn)− log(1− tn)
1− tn
tn
+ η(1)n .
Now, from standard results on typical sequences (see Ap-
pendix A-A), 2−n(I(U ;A)+η(2)n ) ≤ tn ≤ 2−n(I(U ;A)−η(2)n ) for
some sequence η(2)n −−−−→
n→∞
0. Since log(1−x)
x
−−−→
x→0
−1, this
yields
H(s1) ≤ n(I(U ;A) + η
(2)
n ) + 1 + η
(3)
n + η
(1)
n ,
for some sequence η(3)n −−−−→
n→∞
0.
The third term can be studied following the argument of [34,
Section 2.3] for the wiretap channel:
• First, we define the following random variable:
Eˆn =
{
En if (En, un(s1)) ∈ T nδ (E,U)
∅ otherwise , (29)
and write:
1
n
H(En|s1) =
1
n
2nS1∑
j=1
H(En|s1 = j) Pr {s1 = j}
=
1
n
2nS1∑
j=1
H(EnEˆn|s1 = j) Pr {s1 = j}
=
1
n
2nS1∑
j=1
(
H(Eˆn|s1 = j)
+H(En|Eˆn, s1 = j)
)
Pr {s1 = j} , (30)
where the second equality follows from the fact that
random variable Eˆn is a deterministic function of En
and s1. We now study each term of the r.h.s. of (30).
• The first term can be upper bounded as follows:
1
n
2nS1∑
j=1
H(Eˆn|s1 = j) Pr {s1 = j}
(a)
≤
1
n
2nS1∑
j=1
log (‖T nδ (E|u
n(j))‖ + 1)Pr {s1 = j}
(b)
≤
2nS1∑
j=1
(
H(E|U) + η(4)n
)
Pr {s1 = j}
= H(E|U) + η(4)n ,
where step (a) follows from definition (29), step (b) from
Lemma 2 for some sequence η(4)n −−−−→
n→∞
0.
• Fano’s inequality [56] yields the following upper bound
on the second term of the r.h.s. of Equation (30):
1
n
2nS1∑
j=1
H(En|Eˆn, s1 = j) Pr {s1 = j}
≤
1
n
2nS1∑
j=1
(
1 + Pr
{
En 6= Eˆn
∣∣∣s1 = j} log‖En‖)
× Pr {s1 = j}
≤
1
n
+
2nS1∑
j=1
Pr {(En, un(s1)) /∈ T
n
δ (E,U)|s1 = j}
× log‖E‖Pr {s1 = j}
≤
1
n
+ P0Pe,1 log‖E‖ .
From Section B-F, if S1 > I(U ;A), then quantity P0Pe,1
vanishes as n tends to infinity, and the above equation
yields
1
n
2nS1∑
j=1
H(En|Eˆn, s1 = j) Pr {s1 = j} ≤ η
(5)
n ,
for some sequence η(5)n −−−−→
n→∞
0.
• Gathering the above inequalities, we proved the following
equivalent of Equation (2.54) of [34]:
H(En|s1) ≤ n
(
H(E|U) + η(4)n + η
(5)
n
)
.
Equation (27) along with the above results yields
1
n
H(An|s1E
n) ≥ H(AE)− I(U ;A)− η(2)n
−
1 + η
(3)
n + η
(1)
n
n
−H(E|U)− η(4)n − η
(5)
n . (31)
Using the Markov chain U −
−A−
−E, this proves Lemma 6.
I. End of Proof
In this section, we proved that sufficient conditions for
the achievability of a tuple (RA, RC , D,∆) are given by the
following system of inequalities, for each ε > 0:

R1 > 0
R2 > 0
RA + ε = R1 +R2
RC ≥ 0
S1 ≥ R1
S2 ≥ R2
SC ≥ RC + ε
S1 > I(U ;A)
S2 > I(V ;A|U)
SC > I(W ;C)
S1 −R1 + S2 −R2 + SC −RC − ε < I(V ;W )
S1 −R1 + S2 −R2 < I(V,W )
S2 −R2 < I(V ;W |U)
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)−R2
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Fourier-Motzkin elimination then yields:


RA + ε > I(V ;A|W )
RC + ε > I(W ;C|V )
RA +RC + 2ε > I(VW ;AC)
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
∆ < H(A|VW ) + I(A;W |U)
−I(A;E|U)
∆−RC − ε < H(A|V )− I(A;E|U)− I(W ;C|V )
This proves Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 (BOUNDS ON THE
CARDINALITIES)
A. Bound on ‖W‖
First, note that the single-letter inequalities of Theorem 1
can be written as follows:
RA ≥ I(V ;A|W ) ,
RC ≥ H(C|V )−H(C|VW ) ,
RA +RC ≥ I(V ;A) +H(C|V )−H(C|V W ) ,
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
,
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|W ) + I(U ;A|W ) ,
∆−RC ≤ H(A|V )− I(A;E|U)−H(C|V ) +H(C|V W ) .
We then use Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory’s theorem and
follow standard arguments (see [55, Appendix C]). Consider
the following ‖C‖+ 3 continuous functions of p(c|w):
p(c|w) ,
I(V ;A|W = w) ,
H(C|V,W = w) = H(CV |W = w)−H(V |W = w) ,
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
∣∣W = w] ,
I(U ;A|W = w)
From Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory’s theorem, there exists
a random variable W ′ on W ′ with ‖W ′‖ ≤ ‖C‖ + 3 such
that p(c), I(V ;A|W ), H(C|VW ), E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
and
I(U ;A|W ) are preserved.
B. Bounds on ‖U‖ and ‖V‖
We now rewrite the inequalities of Theorem 1 as follows:
RA ≥ H(A|W )−H(A|VW ) ,
RC ≥ I(W ;C|V ) ,
RA +RC ≥ I(W ;C) +H(A|W )−H(A|VW ) ,
D ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
,
∆ ≤ H(A|VW ) + I(A;W |U)− I(A;E|U) ,
∆−RC ≤ H(A|V )− I(A;E|U)− I(W ;C|V ) .
Consider the following ‖A‖ + 5 continuous functions
of p(v|u):
p(a|u) = E
[
p(a|V )
∣∣U = u] ,
H(A|VW,U = u) = H(AVW |U = u)−H(VW |U = u) ,
I(W ;C|V, U = u) = I(W ;C|U = u)− I(W ;V |U = u) ,
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
∣∣U = u] ,
I(A;W |U = u) ,
I(A;E|U = u) ,
H(A|V, U = u) = H(AV |U = u)−H(V |u = u) .
From Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory’s theorem, there ex-
ists a random variable U ′ on U ′ with ‖U ′‖ ≤ ‖A‖ + 5
such that p(a), H(A|VW ), I(W ;C|V ), E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
,
I(A;W |U), I(A;E|U), and H(A|V ) are preserved.
Now, for each u′ ∈ U ′, consider the following ‖A‖ + 3
continuous functions of p(a|u′, v):
p(a|u′, v) ,
H(A|W,U ′ = u′, V = v) = H(AW |U ′ = u′, V = v)
−H(W |U ′ = u′, V = v) ,
I(W ;C|U ′ = u′, V = v) ,
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
∣∣U ′ = u′, V = v] ,
H(A|U ′ = u′, V = v) .
From Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory’s theorem, there exists
a set V ′ with ‖V ′‖ ≤ ‖A‖+3 and, for each u′ ∈ U ′, a random
variable V ′|{U ′ = u′} on V ′ and a function Aˆ′u′ : V ′ ×W →
A, such that p(a|u′), H(A|VW,U ′ = u′), I(W ;C|V, U ′ =
u′), E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
∣∣U ′ = u′], and H(A|V, U ′ = u′) are
preserved.
Then define set V ′′ = U ′ × V ′, random variable V ′′ =
(U ′, V ′) and function Aˆ′′ : V ′′ × W → A by Aˆ′′(v′′, w) =
Aˆ′′(u′, v′, w) , Aˆ′u′(v
′, w). From the above cardinality
bounds, ‖V ′′‖ ≤ (‖A‖+5)(‖A‖+3). Note that U ′−
−V ′′−
−
A−
−(C,E) form a Markov chain. From these new definitions
and previous constructions, we check that quantities involving
variable V are preserved:
H(A|V ′′W ) = H(A|U ′V ′W )
= H(A|U ′VW )
= H(A|V W ) ,
I(W ;C|V ′′) = I(W ;C|U ′V ′)
= I(W ;C|U ′V )
= I(W ;C|V ) ,
E
[
d(A, Aˆ′′(V ′′,W ))
]
= E
[
d(A, Aˆ′U ′ (V
′,W ))
]
= E
[
E
[
d(A, Aˆ′U ′ (V
′,W ))
∣∣U ′]]
= E
[
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
∣∣U ′]]
= E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
,
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and
H(A|V ′′) = H(A|U ′V ′)
= H(A|U ′V )
= H(A|V ) .
This proves Proposition 1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 (OUTER BOUND)
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. Let (RA, RC , D,∆)
be an achievable tuple and ε > 0. There exists an (n,RA +
ε,RC + ε)-code (fA, fC , g) s.t.:
E
[
d(An, g(fA(A
n), fC(C
n)))
]
≤ D + ε ,
1
n
H(An|fA(A
n), En) ≥ ∆− ε .
Denote by J = fA(An) and K = fC(Cn) the mes-
sages transmitted by Alice and Charlie, respectively. From
these definitions and the fact that random variables Ai, Ci,
Ei are independent across time, the joint distribution of
(J,K,An, Cn, En) can be written as follows:
p(j, k, an, cn, en) = IfA(an)(j) IfC (cn)(k)
× p(ai−1, ci−1, ei−1) p(ai, ci, ei) p(a
n
i+1, c
n
i+1, e
n
i+1) .
Following the technique described in Appendix A-B and using
the above expansion, we can obtain the graphs of Fig. 16.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define random variables Ui, Vi and
Wi as follows:
Ui = (J,A
i−1, Ei−1) , (32)
Vi = (J,A
i−1, Ci−1, Ei−1) , (33)
Wi = (K, C
i−1 ) . (34)
From Fig. 16, Ui−
−Vi−
−Ai−
−(Ci, Ei) and Wi−
−Ci−
−(Ai, Ei)
form Markov chains (see Appendix A-B for details on this
graphical technique for checking Markov relations).
Following the usual technique, we also define an inde-
pendent random variable Q uniformly distributed over the
set {1, . . . , n}, and A = AQ, C = CQ, E = EQ,
U = (Q,UQ), V = (Q, VQ), and W = (Q,WQ). Note that
U −
− V −
−A−
− (C,E) and W −
−C −
− (A,E) still form
Markov chains, and that (A,C,E) is distributed according to
the joint distribution p(a, c, e) i.e., the original distribution of
(Ai, Ci, Ei).
J
Ani+1
Ai
Ai−1
(Cni+1 E
n
i+1)
(Ci Ei)
(Ci−1 Ei−1)
(a)
(Ani+1 E
n
i+1)
(Ai Ei)
(Ai−1 Ei−1)
Cni+1
Ci
Ci−1
K
(b)
J
Ani+1
Ai
Ai−1
Eni+1
Ei
Ei−1
Cni+1
Ci
Ci−1
K
(c)
Figure 16: Outer bound–Graphical representation of probabil-
ity distributions (a) p(j, an, cn, en), (b) p(k, an, cn, en) and (c)
p(j, k, an, cn, en).
A. Rate at Alice
n(RA + ε) ≥ H(J)
(a)
= I(J ;KAnCnEn)
(b)
≥ I(J ;AnCnEn|K)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(J ;AiCiEi|KA
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(JAi−1Ei−1;AiCiEi|KC
i−1)
−I(Ai−1Ei−1;AiCiEi|KC
i−1)
]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(JAi−1Ci−1Ei−1;AiCiEi|KC
i−1)
(e)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Ai|Wi) ,
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where
• step (a) follows from J = fA(An),
• step (b) from the non-negativity of mutual information,
• step (c) from the chain rule for conditional mutual
information,
• step (d) from the Markov chain (Ai, Ci, Ei) −
−
(K,Ci−1)−
− (Ai−1, Ei−1) (see Fig. 16b),
• step (e) from the non-negativity of mutual information
and definitions (33), (34).
Using random variable Q, this yields
RA + ε ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(VQ;AQ|WQ, Q = i)
= I(VQ;AQ|WQQ)
= I(V ;A|W ) .
B. Rate at Charlie
Using similar arguments with K = fC(Cn), we can obtain:
n(RC + ε) ≥ H(K)
(a)
= I(K; JAnCnEn)
(b)
≥ I(K;AnCnEn|J)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(K;AiCiEi|JA
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(KCi−1;AiCiEi|JA
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Wi;Ci|Vi) ,
where
• step (a) follows from K = fC(Cn),
• step (b) from the non-negativity of mutual information,
• step (c) from the chain rule for conditional mutual
information,
• step (d) from the non-negativity of mutual information
and definitions (33), (34).
Then, using auxiliary random variable Q,
RC + ε ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(WQ;CQ|VQ, Q = i) = I(W ;C|V ) .
C. Sum-rate
n(RA +RC + 2ε) ≥ H(JK)
(a)
= I(JK;AnCnEn)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(JK;AiCiEi|A
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(JKAi−1Ci−1Ei−1;AiCiEi)
−I(Ai−1Ci−1Ei−1;AiCiEi)
]
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(JKAi−1Ci−1Ei−1;AiCiEi)
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(ViWi;AiCi) ,
where
• step (a) follows from J = fA(An) and K = fC(Cn),
• step (b) from the chain rule for mutual information,
• step (c) from the fact that random variables Ai, Ci and
Ei are independent across time,
• step (d) from the non-negativity of mutual information
and definitions (33), (34).
Using random variable Q, this yields
RA + RC + 2ε ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(VQWQ;AQCQ|Q = i)
= I(VW ;AC) .
D. Distortion at Bob
Bob reconstructs g(J,K). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define
function Aˆi as the i-th coordinate of this estimate:
Aˆi(Vi,Wi) , gi(J,K) .
The component-wise mean distortion at Bob thus verifies
D + ε ≥ E
[
d(An, g(J,K))
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
d(Ai, Aˆi(Vi,Wi))
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
d(AQ, AˆQ(VQ,WQ))
∣∣∣ Q = i]
= E
[
d(AQ, AˆQ(VQ,WQ))
]
= E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
,
where we defined function Aˆ by
Aˆ(V,W ) = Aˆ(Q, VQ,WQ) , AˆQ(VQ,WQ) .
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E. Equivocation rate at Eve
n(∆− ε) ≤ H(An|JEn)
= H(An|J)− I(An;En|J)
(a)
= H(An|J)− I(An;En) + I(J ;En)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JA
i−1)− I(Ai;Ei) + I(JE
i−1;Ei)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JKA
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)− I(Ai;Ei)
+I(Ai;KC
i−1Ei−1|JAi−1) + I(JEi−1;Ei)
]
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JKA
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)
+I(Ai;KC
i−1|JAi−1Ei−1)− I(Ai;Ei)
+I(Ai;E
i−1|JAi−1) + I(JAi−1Ei−1;Ei)
]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JKA
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)
+I(Ai;KC
i−1|JAi−1Ei−1)− I(Ai;Ei|JA
i−1Ei−1)
]
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|ViWi) + I(Ai;Wi|Ui)− I(Ai;Ei|Ui)
]
,
where
• step (a) follows from the Markov chain J −
−An−
−En
(see Fig. 16a),
• step (b) from the chain rules for conditional entropy and
mutual information, and the fact that random variables
Ai and Ei are independent across time,
• step (c) from standard identities and the non-negativity
of conditional mutual information,
• step (d) from the Markov chain Ei−
−Ai−
− (JAi−1)−

− Ei−1 (see Fig. 16a),
• step (e) from definitions (32), (33) and (34).
Now, using auxiliary random variable Q,
∆− ε ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
H(AQ|VQWQ, Q = i)
+ I(AQ;WQ|UQ, Q = i)− I(AQ;EQ|UQ, Q = i)
]
= H(A|VW ) + I(A;W |U)− I(A;E|U) .
F. Public-link secrecy rate
n(∆−RC − 2ε) ≤ H(A
n|JEn)−H(K)
(a)
≤ H(An|JEn)−H(K|J)
(b)
= H(An|JEn)− I(K;AnCn|J)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JA
i−1En)
− I(K;AiCi|JA
i−1Ci−1)
]
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JA
i−1Ei)
−I(K;Ci|JA
i−1Ci−1)
]
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JA
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)
−I(Ai;Ei|JA
i−1Ei−1)
−I(KCi−1;Ci|JA
i−1Ci−1Ei−1)
]
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Vi)− I(Ai;Ei|Ui)
−I(Wi;Ci|Vi)
]
,
where
• step (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces
the entropy,
• step (b) from K = fC(Cn),
• step (c) from the chain rules for conditional entropy and
conditional mutual information,
• step (d) from the non-negativity of conditional mutual
information,
• step (e) from the Markov chains Ai −
− (J,Ai−1) −

− (Ci−1, Ei−1) (see Fig. 16a) and (K,Ci) −
−
(J,Ai−1, Ci−1)−
−Ei−1 (see Fig. 16c),
• step (f) from definitions (32), (33) and (34).
Using auxiliary random variable Q,
∆−RC−2ε ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
H(AQ|VQ, Q = i)
−I(AQ;EQ|UQ, Q = i)− I(WQ;CQ|VQ, Q = i)
]
= H(A|V )− I(A;E|U)− I(W ;C|V ) .
G. End of Proof
We proved that, for each achievable tuple (RA, RC , D,∆)
and each ε > 0, there exist random variables U , V and W
such that U −
− V −
−A−
− (C,E) and W −
−C −
− (A,E)
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form Markov chains, and a function Aˆ such that
RA + ε ≥ I(V ;A|W ) ,
RC + ε ≥ I(W ;C|V ) ,
RA +RC + 2ε ≥ I(VW ;AC) ,
D + ε ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,W ))
]
,
∆− ε ≤ H(A|VW ) + I(A;W |U)− I(A;E|U) ,
∆−RC − 2ε ≤ H(A|V )− I(A;E|U)− I(W ;C|V ) ,
i.e., (RA+ε,RC+ε,D+ε,∆−ε) ∈ Rout. Recalling that region
Rout is closed, and letting ε tend to zero prove Theorem 2.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF THEOREM 3
Let (RA, D,∆) be an achievable tuple and ε > 0. There
exists an (n,RA + ε)-code (f, g) s.t.:
E [d(An, g(f(An), Cn))] ≤ D + ε ,
1
n
H(An|f(An), En) ≥ ∆− ε .
Denote by J = f(An) the transmitted message, and define
variables Ui and Vi as follows, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
Ui = (J, C
n
i+1, E
i−1) , (35)
Vi = (J,A
i−1, Ci−1, Cni+1, E
i−1) . (36)
From Fig. 16a, Ui −
− Vi −
−Ai −
− (Ci, Ei) form a Markov
chain.
We also define an independent random variable Q uniformly
distributed over the set {1, . . . , n}, and A = AQ, C = CQ,
E = EQ, U = (Q,UQ), and V = (Q, VQ). U −
−V −
−A−
−
(C,E) still form a Markov chain and (A,C,E) is distributed
according to the joint distribution p(a, c, e) i.e., the original
distribution of (Ai, Ci, Ei).
A. Rate
n(RA + ε) ≥ H(J)
(a)
= I(J ;AnCnEn)
(b)
≥ I(J ;AnEn|Cn)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(J ;AiEi|A
i−1CnEi−1)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(JAi−1Ci−1Cni+1E
i−1;AiEi|Ci)
−I(Ai−1Ci−1Cni+1E
i−1;AiEi|Ci)
]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(JAi−1Ci−1Cni+1E
i−1;AiEi|Ci)
(e)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Ai|Ci) ,
where
• step (a) follows from J = f(An),
• step (b) from the non-negativity of mutual information,
• step (c) from the chain rule for conditional mutual
information,
• step (d) from the fact that random variables Ai, Ci and
Ei are independent across time,
• step (e) from the non-negativity of mutual information
and definition (36).
Then, using random variable Q,
RA + ε ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(VQ;AQ|CQ, Q = i)
= I(VQ;AQ|CQQ)
= I(V ;A|C) .
B. Distortion at Bob
Bob reconstructs g(J,Cn). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define
function Aˆi as the i-th coordinate of this estimate:
Aˆi(Vi, Ci) , gi(J,C
i−1, Ci, C
n
i+1) .
The component-wise mean distortion at Bob thus verifies
D + ε ≥ E [d(An, g(J,Cn))]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
d(Ai, Aˆi(Vi, Ci))
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
d(AQ, AˆQ(VQ, CQ))
∣∣∣ Q = i]
= E
[
d(AQ, AˆQ(VQ, CQ))
]
= E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,C))
]
,
where we defined function Aˆ on V × C by
Aˆ(V,C) = Aˆ(Q, VQ, CQ) , AˆQ(VQ, CQ) .
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C. Equivocation Rate at Eve
n(∆− ε) ≤ H(An|J,En)
= H(An|J)− I(An;En|J)
= H(An|JCn) + I(An;Cn|J)− I(An;En|J)
(a)
= H(An|JCn) + I(An;Cn)− I(J ;Cn)
−I(An;En) + I(J ;En)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JA
i−1Cn) + I(Ai;Ci)
−I(JCni+1;Ci)− I(Ai;Ei) + I(JE
i−1;Ei)
]
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JA
i−1CnEi−1) + I(Ai;Ci)
−I(JCni+1;Ci)− I(Ai;Ei) + I(JE
i−1;Ei)
+I(Ei;C
n
i+1|JE
i−1)− I(Ci;E
i−1|JCni+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|JA
i−1CnEi−1) + I(Ai;Ci)
−I(Ai;Ei) + I(Ei; JC
n
i+1E
i−1)
−I(Ci; JC
n
i+1E
i−1)
]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|ViCi) + I(Ai;Ci)
−I(Ai;Ei) + I(Ei;Ui)− I(Ci;Ui)
]
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|ViCi) + I(Ai;Ci|Ui)
−I(Ai;Ei|Ui)
]
,
where
• step (a) follows from the Markov chain J −
− An −
−
(Cn, En),
• step (b) from the chain rules for conditional entropy and
mutual information, and the fact that random variables
Ai, Ci and Ei are independent across time,
• step (c) from the Markov chain (Ai, Ci)−
− (JAi−1)−

− (Ci−1, Ei−1) (see Fig. 16a) and Csiszár and Körner’s
equality [28] (see Appendix A-C),
• step (d) from definitions (35) and (36),
• step (e) from the Markov chain Ui −
−Ai −
− (Ci, Ei).
Using auxiliary random variable Q, this yields
∆− ε ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
H(AQ|VQCQ, Q = i)
+ I(AQ;CQ|UQ, Q = i)− I(AQ;EQ|UQ, Q = i)
]
= H(A|V C) + I(A;C|U)− I(A;E|U) .
D. End of Proof
We proved that, for each achievable tuple (RA, D,∆) and
each ε > 0, there exist random variables U , V such that U −

− V −
−A−
− (C,E) forms a Markov chain, and
RA + ε ≥ I(V ;A|C) ,
D + ε ≥ E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,C))
]
,
∆− ε ≤ H(A|V C) + I(A;C|U) − I(A;E|U) .
Recalling that region R∗uncoded is closed, and letting ε tend to
zero prove the converse part of Theorem 3.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF THEOREM 4
Let (RA, RC ,∆) be an achievable tuple and ε > 0. There
exists an (n,RA + ε,RC + ε)-code (fA, fC , g) s.t.:
Pr {g(fA(A
n), fC(C
n)) 6= (An, Cn)} ≤ ε ,
1
n
H(An|fA(A
n), En) ≥ ∆− ε .
Denote by J = fA(An) and K = fC(Cn) the messages
transmitted by Alice and Charlie, respectively. For each i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, define random variable Ui by
Ui = (J,C
n
i+1, E
i−1) . (37)
From Fig. 16a, Ui −
−Ai −
− (Ci, Ei) form a Markov chain.
We also define an independent random variable Q uniformly
distributed over the set {1, . . . , n}, and A = AQ, C = CQ,
E = EQ, U = (Q,UQ). Note that U−
−A−
−(C,E) still form
a Markov chain, and that (A,C,E) is distributed according to
the joint distribution p(a, c, e) i.e., the original distribution of
(Ai, Ci, Ei).
A. Rate at Alice
Following the argument of the converse for the Slepian-Wolf
theorem [56, Section 15.4.2], we prove lower bounds on the
rates:
n(RA + ε) ≥ H(J)
(a)
≥ H(J |Cn)
(b)
= I(An; J |Cn)
(c)
= H(An|Cn)−H(An|JKCn)
(d)
≥ nH(A|C) − nO(ε) ,
where
• step (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces
the entropy,
• step (b) from J = fA(An),
• step (c) from K = fC(Cn),
• step (d) from the fact that random variables Ai and Ci
are i.i.d., and Fano’s inequality4.
4Landau-like notation O(ε) stands for a term X such that 0 ≤ X ≤ kε
for some constant k > 0.
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B. Rate at Charlie
Using similar arguments with K = fC(Cn), we can obtain:
n(RC + ε) ≥ H(K)
(a)
≥ H(K|J)
(b)
= I(K;Cn|J)
= H(Cn|J)−H(Cn|JK)
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Ci|JC
n
i+1)− nO(ε)
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Ci|Ui)− nO(ε) ,
where
• step (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces
the entropy,
• step (b) from K = fC(Cn),
• step (c) from the chain rule for conditional entropy and
Fano’s inequality,
• step (d) from the fact that conditioning reduces the
entropy, and definition (37).
Now, using auxiliary random variable Q,
RC + ε ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(CQ|UQ, Q = i)−O(ε)
= H(C|U)−O(ε) . (38)
C. Sum-rate
A lower bound on the sum-rate can be derived as well:
n(RA +RC + 2ε) ≥ H(JK)
(a)
= I(AnCn; JK)
(b)
≥ nH(AC)− nO(ε) ,
where
• step (a) follows from J = fA(An) and K = fC(Cn),
• step (b) from the fact that random variables Ai and Ci
are i.i.d., and Fano’s inequality.
D. Equivocation rate at Eve
n(∆− ε) ≤ H(An|JEn)
= H(An|J)− I(An;En|J)
= H(An|JK) + I(An;K|J)− I(An;En|J)
(a)
≤ nO(ε) + I(An;Cn|J)− I(An;En|J)
(b)
= nO(ε) + I(An;Cn)− I(J ;Cn)− I(An;En)
+I(J ;En)
(c)
= nO(ε) +
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ai;Ci)− I(JC
n
i+1;Ci)
−I(Ai;Ei) + I(JE
i−1;Ei)
]
(d)
= nO(ε) +
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ai;Ci)− I(JC
n
i+1;Ci)
−I(Ai;Ei) + I(JE
i−1;Ei)
+I(Ei;C
n
i+1|JE
i−1)− I(Ci;E
i−1|JCni+1)
]
= nO(ε) +
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ai;Ci)− I(JC
n
i+1E
i−1;Ci)
−I(Ai;Ei) + I(JC
n
i+1E
i−1;Ei)
]
(e)
= nO(ε) +
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ai;Ci|Ui)− I(Ai;Ei|Ui)
]
,
where
• step (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, and K =
fC(C
n),
• step (b) from the Markov chain J −
−An −
− (Cn, En),
• step (c) from the chain rule for mutual information,
and the fact that random variables Ai, Ci, and Ei are
independent across time,
• step (d) from Csiszár and Körner’s equality [28] (see
Appendix A-C),
• step (e) from definition (37), and the Markov chain Ui−

−Ai −
− (Ci, Ei).
Now, using auxiliary random variable Q,
∆− ε ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(AQ;CQ|UQ, Q = i)
−I(AQ;EQ|UQ, Q = i)
]
+O(ε)
= I(A;C|U)− I(A;E|U) +O(ε) .
E. End of Proof
We proved that, for each achievable tuple (RA, RC ,∆) and
each ε > 0, there exists a random variable U such that U −
−
A−
− (C,E) form a Markov chain, and
RA +O(ε) ≥ H(A|C) ,
RC +O(ε) ≥ H(C|U) ,
RA +RC +O(ε) ≥ H(AC) ,
∆−O(ε) ≤ I(A;C|U)− I(A;E|U) .
Recalling that region R∗lossless is closed, and letting ε tend to
zero prove the converse part of Theorem 4.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF PROPOSITION 4
The proof of the converse part of Proposition 4 follows the
same argument that Appendix F. In particular, definition (37)
remains the same. The only difference lies in the lower bound
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for the rate at Alice:
n(RA + ε) ≥ H(J)
(a)
= I(J ;An|Cn) + I(J ;Cn)
(b)
= H(An|Cn)−H(An|JKCn) + I(J ;Cn)
(c)
≥ −nO(ε) +
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Ci) + I(JC
n
i+1;Ci)
]
(d)
= −nO(ε) +
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Ci) + I(JC
n
i+1;Ci)
+I(Ei−1;Ci|JC
n
i+1)− I(C
n
i+1;Ei|JE
i−1)
]
(e)
≥ −nO(ε) +
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Ci)
+I(JCni+1E
i−1;Ci)− I(JC
n
i+1E
i−1;Ei)
]
(f)
= −nO(ε) +
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Ci) + I(Ui;Ci)
−I(Ui;Ei)
]
,
where
• step (a) follows from J = fA(An),
• step (b) from K = fC(Cn),
• step (c) from Fano’s inequality, the chain rule for con-
ditional mutual information and the fact that random
variables Ai, Ci are independent across time,
• step (d) from Csiszár and Körner’s equality [28],
• step (e) from the fact that random variables Ai, Ci and
Ei are independent across time, and the non-negativity
of mutual information,
• step (f) from definition (37).
Using random variable Q and following the argument of
Appendix F, we proved the following lower bound:
RA + ε ≥ H(A|C) + I(U ;C)− I(U ;E)−O(ε) .
Since Equation (38) still holds, we proved the bound on
RA given by Proposition 4. Other steps of the proof remain
unchanged.
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